An Analysis of Occupational Licensing Policies in Texas by Quarles, Judd H.
An Analysis of Occupational Licensing Policies in Texas
A Dissertation submitted
to the Graduate School
Valdosta State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
in Public Administration
in the Department of Political Science
of the College of Arts and Sciences
May 2016
Judd H. Quarles
M.A., The University of Texas at Tyler, 2008
B.S., The University of Texas at Tyler, 2006
 









As the regulatory efforts of government continue to increase at all levels, more 
attention is being given to the public policy topic of occupational licensing.  Decisions on 
whether or not to require occupational licensing should be made on a case-by-case basis, 
after considering the health and safety risks presented to the public, as well as the costs 
and benefits of such policies.  This dissertation examined occupational licensing policies 
in Texas by using three methods: case studies of six occupational licensing proposals 
offered in recent sessions of the Texas legislature, an empirical study of occupational 
licensing in Texas, and an empirical study comparing occupational licensing policies for 
behavior analysts across the 50 states.  
The findings of the case studies revealed that legislators in Texas often make 
decisions on whether or not licensing should be required in an occupation with very little 
information about the health and safety risks to the public, instances of harm that have 
actually taken place, or the costs and benefits found where licensing is already required.  
In the empirical studies, it was found that the best predictor of whether or not licensing 
would be required for an occupation in Texas was the amount of other states requiring 
licensing for the same occupation.  Despite the fact that health and safety concerns are 
one of the most commonly stated reasons for individuals and groups to support 
occupational licensing requirements, occupations with higher accident rates were not 
found to be a significant factor in whether or not an occupation is licensed in Texas.
When comparing Texas to other states, the most significant variable in determining 
which of the 50 states will require occupational licensing for behavior analysts is the per




capita membership numbers in groups who oppose occupational licensing requirements 
for behavior analysts.  
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Usually a matter of state level policymaking in the United States, occupational 
licensing policies are estimated to affect about 29 percent of the nationwide workforce, 
representing about 43 million workers (Kleiner and Krueger 2008).  Many areas of public
policy which affect economic decisions and outcomes receive a great deal of attention in 
academic literature and in news reports to the public.  For example, Stephenson and 
Wendt (2009) discuss the increasing coverage of topics such as labor unions and 
minimum wage laws in texts dealing with economic policy.  Yet, as the two authors point 
out, the topic of licensing does not get the attention that minimum wage policies receive, 
which tend to affect less than 10 percent of the workforce, including teenagers or others 
who do not come from households under the poverty threshold.  Also, unionization gets 
more attention but affects only about 12 percent of the workforce (2009, 181).  
Examining 17 major labor economics textbooks, both in print at the time of their study 
and out of print, the authors found that only seven contained any coverage of 
occupational licensing.  Those that did cover the topic devoted six pages or less (183-
184). Occupational licensing, which is also known as the right to practice, where 
working in an occupation without meeting state requirements is illegal, is the strongest 
form of occupational regulation (Kleiner 2011, 3-4).  Williams notes that some 
exceptionally strong licensing laws fix the number of practitioners in a given occupation,
in addition to regular entry requirements (2011, 61).




According to Young, scholars have traced regulations of professions very similar 
in nature to occupational licensing as far back as ancient Babylon and the Code of 
Hammurabi.  When this document was written about 1800 B.C., it set predetermined fees 
for the services of surgeons and imposed penalties for malpractice.  Young believes that 
the first example of a licensing law similar to today’s laws was found in 13th century 
Sicily, where physicians were required to have extensive training, take an examination, 
and obtain a license (1989, 9).  Kleiner mentions the issue of licensing as discussed by 
Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations, where Smith focused on the ability of the crafts to 
lengthen apprenticeship programs and limit the number of apprenticeships per master as a 
way to limit practitioners and allow for higher earnings for those already in the 
occupations (2006, 3).  Young also mentions craft guilds of medieval times, which 
possessed quasi-governmental authority, and states that professional associations worked 
in conjunction with governmental authorities to implement occupational regulations.  In 
the 16th century, the laissez faire philosophy began to emerge, and people came to see 
intermediate groups such as guilds to be too controlling and in violation of the social 
contract between rulers and subjects.  As this happened, English guilds came to depend 
on the state to implement enforceable monopoly privileges, something that Young sees as 
similar to the current licensing structures found throughout the United States (1989, 10).  
Occupations first became regulated in the United States when doctors came under 
licensure in Virginia in 1639 for the purpose of regulating fees.  A decade later, 
regulations in Massachusetts were intended to ensure quality in the practice of medicine.  
Young states that the early licensing movement in the United States met with 
considerable resistance in the 1830s and 1840s, as many people subscribed to the laissez 




faire philosophy espoused by Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson.  During this time, 
proposed licensing laws were defeated in several states and licensing requirements 
already in place were repealed in others (11-12). Friedman states that occupational 
licensing first began to become truly commonplace in American states between 1890 and 
1910 (1965, 489). In 1980, Simon Rottenberg published a study concluding that 
occupational regulation had a positive effect on practitioners, but a negative effect on 
consumers.  Since that time, Kleiner notes that very few studies have detailed the effects 
of occupational licensing (2006, 3).
One primary goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the study of the political 
economy of occupational regulation.  The justification of occupational licensing and 
other forms of regulation often has roots in the desire to protect the health and safety of 
the public.  In some professions, there are common and reasonable arguments that 
negative externalities can result from unqualified practitioners working in the profession.  
An incompetent physician could make mistakes that turn into a public health crisis.  An 
attorney who hasn’t been properly trained could, through his or her actions, place clients 
in legal jeopardy.  Some occupations do not lend themselves to the possibility of having 
such extreme externalities.  Even then, many will argue that the government has an 
interest in protecting the public, essentially from themselves.  Some people will argue 
that without the government’s influence, consumers cannot or will not access enough 
information to make informed decisions.  There is also a belief that consumers will often 
take risks that are unacceptable if harm could be caused.
Despite some compelling reasons for supporting occupational licensing, others 
will argue that any type of barrier to economic entry, including occupational licensing, 




has more to do with economic protectionism than with protecting public health and 
safety.  Milton Friedman (1965) saw efforts of licensing as attempts to enforce, through 
legal mechanisms, goals which a trade or professional association was  not able to 
achieve on its own and saw these groups’ work as seeking to claim and hold territory 
against competitors (503-505).  At the extreme, Friedman (1979) believes licensing leads 
to its own danger for consumers—monopolies that arise due to the lack of competition 
(226).
In contributing to the study on political economy, this dissertation is intended to 
determine whether occupational licensing protects public health and safety or whether it 
is typically sought by incumbent practitioners as a way of restricting entry into 
occupations, with a special focus on Texas.  Perhaps both reasons could contribute to 
whether a particular occupation becomes licensed.  While Schlomach (2012) 
acknowledges a number of arguments in defense of licensing, he states that such defenses 
are usually advocated by members of the profession and not by the general public.  This 
would seem to indicate that while the public may not be aware of specific benefits from 
occupational licensing, the public interest could possibly be served at the same time as
the economic interests of practitioners.
This dissertation also has a major goal related to the public administration 
process, and that is to inform policy issues in the state of Texas related to occupational 
licensing.  The paper will also attempt to explain why some occupations have licensing 
requirements and others do not.  For instance, shampooers in Texas who are not 
cosmetologists must have a license but anesthesiology assistants, who work directly with 
patients in operating rooms, have no licensure requirement.  This dissertation also shines 




light on evidence to support the claim often made by economists that professional 
organizations seek licensing requirements from their occupation rather than the state 
imposing it upon them without industry support.  Many who have studied licensing, such 
as Dr. Morris Kleiner, believe that professional associations often raise funds from 
members to lobby legislatures in support of licensing requirements, especially committee 
chairs of committees which will consider licensing bills (2011, 5).  Kleiner surmises that 
licensing can restrict supply and raise prices (2011, 6) and that licensing has a large 
influence on wage determination (23).
Chapter 2 of this dissertation will review relevant literature on the topic of 
occupational licensing, much of which seems to center around economic effects of 
occupational licensing, the opinion of practitioners on licensing for their own industry, 
and whether or not the licensing requirements are beneficial for the public.  Very little of 
the literature appears to take an in-depth look at the actual policymaking process leading 
to occupational licensing requirements.
Chapter 3 describes methodology that will be used including a study of six 
professions that went through the licensure process in Texas in recent years: roofing 
contractors, real estate inspectors, veterinary technicians, foundation repair contractors, 
associate auctioneers, and anesthesiology assistants.  Three of these occupations are now 
licensed by the state, while legislation did not pass requiring licensure for the other three.  
The study of these particular occupations is intended to show how occupational licensing 
gets on the legislative agenda, how individuals and groups work in support of or in 
opposition to occupational licensing legislation, and what makes some attempts at 
passing occupational licensing legislation succeed, while other similar legislation fails to 




pass. Chapter 3 also describes statistical tests that are intended to determine whether 
occupations presenting a greater risk to the public are the most likely to be licensed, and 
also that are intended to determine whether there is a correlation between the membership 
size and political power of a professional association and whether or not their occupation 
has a licensing requirement. Accident rates are used as an estimate of the level of danger 
posed to the public by unqualified practitioners in licensed occupations.  This 
measurement follows the idea that higher accident rates are more likely to be associated 
with dangerous occupations.  To determine which professional associations are politically 
organized, the amount of money spent on lobbying by the associations is used.  Based on 
these two measurements, a determination will be made of whether the state of Texas is 
more likely to require licensing for occupations that pose a higher risk to the public, 
occupations with politically active professional organizations, or both.
Finally, Chapter 3 also describes statistical testing that will be used to determine 
if there is any correlation between whether or not an occupation requires licensing in 
different states and characteristics specific to those states. Young points out that while all 
states have some type of occupational regulations in place, the type and extent vary 
widely across states (1989, 4).  For the purpose of attempting to show correlation 
between licensing and state-specific characteristics, the occupation of behavior analysts is 
studied.  This occupation was not licensed in any state prior to 2009, but it now has 
licensure requirements in 24 states.  Texas recently considered legislation to require 
licensing for behavior analysts, but it did not pass.  Statistical methods are used to show 
whether there is a correlation between political organization of groups who are supportive 
of licensing and other factors and the enactment of licensing requirements by states.




Chapter 4 will present the results of the case studies and the statistical tests.  
Results of the case studies will be described after records relevant to the legislation are
reviewed, hours of committee hearings and House and Senate floor sessions were 
reviewed, and other relevant information was considered.  Also, Chapter 4 will present 
the results of the statistical tests along with an explanation of whether or not occupational 
licensing policies in Texas tend to be directed at occupations that pose the greatest risk to 
the public and whether the political power of professional associations is correlated with 
licensing requirements for their occupations.  Finally, Chapter 4 will present the results of 
statistical tests in order to determine correlation in regards to an occupation having
licensing requirements in some states but not others.
Chapter 5 will conclude with a discussion of the results and recommendations for 
Texas policymakers as they consider future changes to existing occupational licensing 
requirements or the imposition of new requirements.
Overall, this dissertation aims to study the political economy of occupational 
licensing, explain factors that may determine why some occupations require licensing and 
others do not within the state of Texas, and study social and political characteristics of 
states that may explain why a specific occupation has required licensing in some states, 
but not others.  Also, by the use of case studies, this dissertation aims to provide an in-
depth look at the policymaking process where occupational licensing proposals are 
considered in Texas.






Public Interest Justifications for Occupational Licensing
Throughout the literature, three public interest justifications are often invoked to 
support the enactment of occupational licensing policies.  It is often said that consumers 
may not have enough information to make informed decisions about a service, so it is a 
necessary public policy choice for the state governments to enact licensing requirements 
to deal with this problem.  Licensing laws are also often adopted due to the government’s 
desire to correct negative externalities that take place if an incompetent or corrupt 
practitioner in an occupation does something that is harmful to the public.  It is also a 
public policy method by which individuals are prevented from choosing lower quality 
service providers when the state feels that it would not be in their best interest to do so.
Lack of Information
While practitioners in an occupation know whether or not they are producing an 
acceptable quality of service, consumers may not know this, especially if they are in the 
position of needing services with which they are totally unfamiliar.  Cox and Foster 
acknowledge that the potential for abuse could also lead to calls for regulations when a 
professional performs the tasks of both diagnosis and treatment.  This is because a 
professional could provide a diagnosis that requires more treatment than what is truly
necessary due to financial incentives to gain more for their services (11).  The authors  
believe that this is most problematic when there are third party payers, the pricing 
structure is based on the amount of services provided or hours worked, or the service in 




question is technically complicated and purchases are infrequent (12).  Occupations 
related to health care are often thought of as needing licensing for this reason, as many 
people do not need specific medical services, may not be totally informed about what all 
is truly necessary and, with insurance, third party payers are often involved.
Even according to individuals who support less regulation and a free market 
approach, information is definitely necessary for markets to function properly.  However, 
it is often stated that this alone is not a compelling reason to enact occupational licensing 
policies.  If the reason for occupational licensing is information alone, then a program of 
voluntary registration or certification would likely be just as beneficial to the majority of 
consumers who were simply in search of information.  The least restrictive form of 
occupational regulation is registration, where individuals file their names, addresses, and 
qualifications with a government agency before practicing an occupation.  They may 
have to pay a fee or post a bond.  Certification is another form of regulation and usually 
allows anyone to perform the occupation, but the government administers an exam, 
determines qualifications, and certifies those who meet the requirements (Kleiner 2011, 
3-4).  Such voluntary programs would allow easy access to information, but would not 
prohibit other individuals choosing not to register or become certified from working in 
occupations and consumers would have the option of choosing other services.  
Slivinski (2015) believes that a system of registration or certification could be 
accomplished with very little involvement from the government.  In the model he 
discusses, promoted by the Goldwater Institute, the state would establish minimal 
requirements for professional associations to register with the state so that policymakers 
could determine that the organizations were legitimate.  Once that is done, the 




associations could develop private certification requirements and when these 
requirements were met, individuals could use the word “certified” in front of their 
professional title.  Slivinski acknowledges that in some occupations, there would be a 
possibility of competing certifiers, but he believes that competition would be good 
because any group involved would have a vested interest in maintaining as many certified 
members as possible, while maintaining the integrity of their organization and profession.  
Under such a system, individuals who chose not to affiliate and become certified with a 
private organization would not be prohibited from working, but could be sued or 
prosecuted under criminal statutes if they claimed to be certified and were not (15-18). 
In addition to programs of registration and certification, Cox and Foster believe 
that many market failures can also be reduced by third party providers of information, 
such as Consumer Reports, the Better Business Bureau, AAA’s Approved Auto Repair 
Services Program, or internet rating and online review web sites which are easily 
accessible by the public (1990, 8-9).  Hottot agrees, stating that more information is 
available to consumers than ever before, especially since the Internet and the use of social 
media has magnified the power of word of mouth (2009, 52). Katsuyama believes that, 
while licensing may provide information as to who offers a minimum quality of services, 
reputations are much more effective when it comes to finding services of modest or high 
quality or when consumers are seeking specialty features.  He believes that reputations 
are dynamic and can change as the quality of services rises and falls or as better 
competitors emerge.  On the other hand, he believes that licenses typically only offer a 
periodic assessment of quality and that licensing boards tend to take action related to 
product or service quality only for egregious violations and not for other things that may 




concern consumers (2010, 579). Because information about service providers and the 
quality of services can be garnered in so many ways, it does not appear that access to 
information is a strong benefit of mandatory occupational licensing policies, so 
information will not be factored into the methodology of this study.
Externalities
Occupational licensing is often justified, as supporters of such policies indicate 
that they may correct market failures in occupations in which there are negative 
externalities from incompetent or dishonest practitioners who harm the public.  Cox and 
Foster (1990) mention possible scenarios that are cause for concern, such as a voluntary 
transaction between two individuals where poor work later harms others not involved in 
the transaction (10).  Someone looking for low cost electrical work to be performed may 
not think about the possibility of fires in the future that could harm someone else’s 
neighboring property.  A foundation repair contractor who does poor work could cause 
problems for future owners of a property, even if the problem does not develop for the 
individual who hired the contractor.  In these examples and others, many people see the
potential quality of service as too low to be acceptable to society, which justifies 
government involvement and public policies to correct the potential for externalities.  
Occupational licensing is one such remedy found in the public policy process and, if 
narrowly tailored, would be designed with the focus of weeding out only practitioners 
who would cause these problems.
States Acting to Protect Individuals
Even when ample information is available to individuals, some people may be 
unwilling or unable to rationally use the information when choosing a service provider 




and, therefore, could cause negative externalities.  This may happen for a variety of 
reasons, including the fact that individuals may underestimate their personal risk in 
choosing a lower quality service or because they may not be able to afford higher quality 
services.  While many people believe that freedom includes the freedom to take risks, 
there is a legitimate public policy question as to whether the role of government should 
include protecting individuals from themselves and their own decision making.  
All three justifications commonly used to promote occupational licensing 
requirements seem to have an end goal of protecting individuals from hurting themselves 
or others.  Since this is often a stated reason for occupational licensure, states should be 
more likely to license occupations that potentially present higher levels of danger to the 
public.
Economic Costs of Occupational Licensing
Once it is known that enactment of occupational licensing policies can drastically 
change who works in a given occupation as well as the costs of entering that occupation, 
it becomes clear that such policies have implications on how the labor market changes.
Beyond the costs of entry, it is often argued that less competition within industries leads 
to higher prices for consumers.  However, other market and societal inefficiencies can be 
found with occupational licensing that are not discussed as often as the cost of services.
Reciprocity and Labor Force Mobility
Since occupational licensing policies are enacted at the state level of government, 
they restrict the movement of individuals working in licensed occupations between states.  
Kleiner discusses how even the executive branch of the federal government through the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Department of Defense have raised 




concerns about occupational licensing policies.  These agencies view the fragmented 
requirements across states as difficult for military personnel and their families, as well as 
others who may move frequently.  At a minimum, there is a call for policymakers to 
allow more reciprocity to recognize other states’ licenses or military training and 
experience (2013, 222-223).  While some states do offer reciprocity for license holders, 
this does not even help all workers.  While one state that licenses auctioneers may grant 
reciprocity for license holders from other states, this does not help an auctioneer who has 
been successfully working in a state that does not require licensing for auctioneers.
Regardless of whether an auctioneer in such a situation could show proof of employment 
as an auctioneer, there would be no license for which reciprocity could be granted. While 
there may be an assumption that reciprocity policies apply to everyone within a given 
occupation, that is not necessarily true.  During an April 15, 2015 hearing of the Texas 
House Committee on Veterans Affairs, a public hearing was held on House Bill 2012, 
which would have expanded reciprocity for veterans and military personnel and their 
spouses who move between states as long as they held a license for an occupation 
“substantially similar” to the occupation in which they were wishing to work in Texas.  It 
is usually up to each specific licensing board or agency to determine what “substantially 
similar” means.  During testimony offered by a representative of the Texas Department of 
Licensing and Regulation (TDLR), State Representative Matt Schaefer asked the TDLR 
representative to define “substantially similar.”  Schaefer further provided the witness 
with an example: Texas requires 1500 hours of training for cosmetology licenses, and 
Massachusetts requires only 1000 hours.  Schaefer then asked the witness to consider the 
hypothetical example of a military spouse who had recently completed cosmetology 




school in Massachusetts and moved to Texas with very little actual work experience, and 
whether or not the occupations would be considered “substantially similar.”  The witness 
responded that in such a case, reciprocity probably would not be granted as there were 
fewer training hours and the person had not yet worked for long enough to make up the 
difference between training hours (Texas House Committee on Defense and Veterans 
Affairs: April 15, 2015 Public Hearing 2015). This is just one example of how an 
individual might assume eligibility for reciprocity, only to later find out otherwise.  
Military families may be the most likely to be affected by occupational licensing 
policies that limit worker mobility.  Approximately 35 percent of military spouses work 
in occupations that require licensure or certification in at least one state.  Also, military 
spouses are 10 times more likely to have moved between states in any given year than are 
civilian license holders.  Military spouses may be out of work for an extended period of 
time when they are forced to acquire a new license due to moving or if they have to meet 
different licensing requirements from those of their previous state (White House 2015).
While many states, as well as licensing boards and agencies, have recently 
engaged in policy discussions and have even passed legislation regarding reciprocity, 
another restriction on worker mobility due to occupational licensing remains largely 
ignored.  This is a mobility restriction that inhibits individuals’ ability to work in similar 
occupations, due to the prevalence of narrow and restrictive licenses.  In Texas, someone 
with a full cosmetology or barber license may perform a range of services including 
cutting hair, shampooing hair, administering manicures and pedicures, administering skin 
care treatments, and more.  However, each of those specialty areas has its own licensure 
for individuals who may not desire to become or be able to afford the time or tuition costs 




that are necessary to become a barber or cosmetologist.  If an individual obtains a 
manicurist license, that individual would be prohibited from working as a skin care 
specialist, despite the fact that the two occupations are very similar.  This would prohibit 
an individual from responding to changing consumer demand for services and if the 
individual wanted to start administering skin care treatments, he or she would have to 
either obtain an additional license as a skin care specialist or as a barber or cosmetologist.  
Due to a lack of information on this type of narrow, specialty licensing found in the 
literature, future study would be helpful.
Economic Costs of Training
Since requirements for occupational licensing are determined by a public policy 
process and not the market, the market-based determination of a balance between the 
quality demanded by the public and what that correlates to in terms of training is absent.  
Even if a licensing proposal somehow starts out with a market-determined level of 
training, it could be greatly changed by the time it moved through the process to become 
law.  Different policymakers who consider legislation at different stages have varying 
political considerations and varying ideas about the proper role of government, so it is 
unusual for most legislation to pass exactly in the form it was filed. Most likely, as a 
function of public administration, policymakers are somewhat arbitrarily choosing an 
acceptable level of quality and some training of education, work experience, and other 
factors that they believe will lead to such a level of quality.  Under voluntary registration 
or certification models as described earlier, the market would dictate the level of training 
as consumers would weigh in on what was necessary by how often they chose a 
registered or certified practitioner as opposed to someone else.  Through the political 




process, policymakers rarely think about whether the public is more willing to pay a 
premium for a cosmetologist who went to school for nine months as opposed to a 
cosmetologist who learned by being an apprentice in a small shop for three months.  In a 
voluntary system, if an organization was registering or certifying cosmetologists with at
least nine months of training and most consumers were willing to use other 
cosmetologists, such activity would send a signal that it would not be profitable for most 
cosmetologists to invest so much time and money into training.  Therefore, to be 
competitive, registering or certifying organizations would likely adjust downward their 
minimum standards to match the level of quality expected by the public.  Without such a 
system, policymakers more or less guess at consumer demand for a given service and 
come up with a system to achieve the level of quality that is demanded.  Even if the 
policymakers hear testimony from lobbyists or people who are generally active in the 
political process, their desires may not be greatly aligned with consumer demand.
Many authors comment on deadweight economic costs due to the lack of 
correlation between occupational licensing policies and consumer demand.  Kleiner 
believes that economic costs of occupational licensing result in deadweight losses to 
United States society of between $34.8 billion and $41.7 billion per year.  This is because 
licensing can represent a barrier for others to enter regulated markets and, therefore, will 
limit competition and the choices available to consumers.  The losses to society occur 
because prices rise over time when there is less competition (2006, 115). As Cox and 
Foster point out, the benefits and costs of regulation depend on the particular service 
market in the particular location in question, so it is important to consider the costs and




benefits of any licensing proposal on a case by case basis (1990, 1).  Yet, this rarely 
seems to be done.
Not Only Incompetent Practitioners are Screened Out
Literature on occupational licensing does not thoroughly describe the intricacies 
of the licensing process and the difference in outcomes for occupations that require a 
relatively concise exam as opposed to those that require months or years of training.  
However, the difficulty, time, and costs associated with such requirements seem to have a
significant impact on who enters various occupations. Complicated mandatory training 
requirements, especially for individuals who tend to be very productive workers, could 
cause fewer people to even attempt entry into an occupation.  If these individuals are 
productive workers and already have a good paying or enjoyable job but simply want to 
explore other occupations or do part-time work on the side, their opportunity cost of 
completing complicated training would be very high.  Larsen found that stricter
occupational licensing requirements for teachers actually drove away highly qualified 
teacher candidates (2013, 20).  A similar study by Wiswall found the same results.  
Wiswall feels that these individuals have higher levels of general skills and are more
likely to receive higher wage offers for other occupations, leading them to leave the 
education field due to the high opportunity cost of becoming a teacher (2013, 2).  An 
example would be an auto mechanic who was interested in teaching an auto shop class
for high school students.  Assuming that the individual had a good work record as an auto 
mechanic, the opportunity costs of, at the least, spending several months and several 
thousand dollars obtaining a teaching certification would be very high.  In many states, if 
the auto mechanic did not have a baccalaureate degree to begin with, he or she would 




have to obtain a degree and a teaching certification in order to be eligible to work as a 
shop teacher.
The requirements for passing written exams, especially those of a standardized 
nature, also tend to impact who is able to enter an occupation, regardless of the person’s 
level of skill at actually performing their service. It is commonly thought that such 
exams often disqualify minority candidates or poor people with low levels of formal 
education, despite the fact that these individuals might be very skilled in their chosen 
trade. Summers believes that licensed workers spend time and money to learn and take 
exams over skills that are not relevant to the work they will actually be doing.  This is 
time that he believes could be better spent learning a variety of skills that, while 
important, may not be covered on a licensing exam as testing standards often deviate 
from practical knowledge (2007, 11). Williams also discusses potentially discriminatory 
effects of licensing examinations.  While some licensing applicants have enough practical 
skills to effectively work in certain trades, Williams sees problems with exams for people 
who have a limited writing or reading ability or whose native language is not English.  
Even license applicants who do well on practical exams often fail these other exam 
requirements (75).  Williams (2011, 78) and other authors such as Carpenter and Ross 
(2009) and Carpenter et al. (2011) discuss African hairbraiding, a form of natural styling 
that does not use chemicals or harsh procedures.  As the technique became popular and 
many entrepreneurs began offering hairbraiding services, many states required the 
practitioners to obtain cosmetology licenses, which can cover as much as 1,600 clock 
hours of training at a tuition cost of at least $5000 before someone is even allowed to take 
a licensing exam.  Yet, most cosmetology curriculum contains little to no information 




about African hairbraiding (Williams 2011, 78).  This is due to the fact that although new 
legislation is passed through the policymaking process and new administrative rules often 
follow, policymakers do not always require approved educational institutions to adjust
their curriculum in accordance.  When cosmetology licensing requirements for 
hairbraiding changed to a modest registration requirement, Carpenter et al. found that 300 
new braiders registered across the state of Mississippi, suggesting that policymakers 
should strongly consider the level of regulation appropriate for specific types of 
cosmetology services (2011, 13).  Again, Williams and others see this type of licensing as 
discriminating against minorities who do not practice traditional cosmetology services.
While this unusually heavy burden on minorities may not be intended, evidence suggests 
that at one time, it was very much intended.  Among comments that occupational 
licensing tends to be anti-competitive, many scholars feel that licensing policies have 
disproportionally negative effects for minorities and poor people.  Harfoush feels that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities clause was created to protect a right to 
earn a living, free from unreasonable interference (2012, 138).  Neily agrees, stating that 
protecting economic liberties appears to have been among the chief concerns of those 
who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment (2013, 156-157).  Harfoush believes 
this is because there were many occupational licensing laws enacted during the time 
period of Reconstruction, after the Civil War.  Harfoush feels that such laws were aimed 
to keep freed slaves from earning a good living which would ultimately lead to fewer of 
them owning property.  As the country went through immigration waves, Harfoush also 
felt that occupational licensing laws were encouraged by the politically powerful at the 
expense of politically disenfranchised groups including Irish immigrants, European Jews, 




Catholics, Asians, and women (2012, 138).  Apparently, many practitioners of various 
occupations felt that new groups entering the workplace would be eager to earn a living 
and would work for cheaper wages, thereby increasing competition for established 
service providers.  Later, Harfoush believes, many Jim Crow era occupational licensing 
laws were again designed to keep African Americans from earning an honest living in the 
profession of their choice (140).
Significant policy questions arise when it comes to the regulation of interior 
designers, because only four states fully regulate the occupation.  As a function of 
federalism, many other states and localities enact certain restrictions on interior design 
while stopping short of full licensure.  Harrington and Treber found that states who 
stringently enforced licensing regulations on who may advertise or practice as an interior 
designer will have a reduction in the number of African Americans and Hispanics who 
practice as interior designers.  The authors also believe the regulations to be 
discriminatory against older workers who may want to enter the interior design 
occupation after another career.  This is because older workers are less likely to have the 
time, flexibility, and resources to return to school and get the necessary training to 
become licensed interior designers (2009, 9).  
The example of Mississippi switching to a registration system for hair braiders 
illustrates another way that voluntary systems of registration and certification offer 
information on service quality that is not offered by required occupational licensing.  The 
market will not reward a hair braider who bears the cost of preparing for and passing a 
cosmetology exam that involves questions on cutting hair and using chemicals, as it is not 
valid to the job performance of the individual once he or she enters an occupation.  




However, a first aid course that is commonly required of nurses is probably valuable to 
most consumers.
High Quality Services versus Cutting Out Some Services Completely
Many questions are asked, and consequently much information is provided in 
regards to whether occupational licensing increases the quality of services.  However, 
even if there is an increase in the quality of services, there may be unintended negative 
consequences that arise when policymakers determine a minimum level of legally 
allowable quality in a specific occupation.  If the minimum level is set at a higher level 
than what the market would likely demand, consumers are artificially restricted in their 
choice of quality levels.  If someone gets paid for poor work, that person enjoys a private 
marginal benefit while, if the work causes harm to a third party, society sees a lower 
social marginal benefit in having that person practice an occupation.  However, at some 
quality point, the private marginal benefit of the practitioner of an occupation will be 
equal to the social marginal benefit of the service that the practitioner provides.  For 
many licensed commonly licensed occupations, any possible harm would likely affect 
only the person choosing the services and not third parties.  If there was a perfect way to 
enact an occupational licensing restriction, it would serve to protect the public in the 
instances where harm could be perpetrated on third parties.
When the legal minimum of quality is set at a higher level than what the market 
demands, consumers become artificially restricted in their choice of services, which can 
lead to other negative consequences for society.  While some people praise licensing 
because it can eliminate substandard work, Summers believes that some people would be 
willing to sacrifice a certain amount of quality if they could receive services at a more 




affordable price.  When people are unable or unwilling to pay the costs associated with 
stronger licensing requirements, they are more likely to attempt to do work on their own.  
Summers cites statistics showing that in areas with tougher licensing restrictions on 
plumbers, retail sales of plumbing equipment are higher.  This would lead one to believe 
that more people are attempting their own plumbing work due to the higher costs or being 
unable to find a service provider because so few can legally operate.  In areas with 
stricter electrical licensing requirements, researchers have found higher incidents of 
electrocution, suggesting that more consumers risk doing their own electrical work (2007, 
12).  Finally, Summers believes that while occupational licensing laws are often touted to 
reduce problems caused by charlatans and scammers, the opposite can occur.  This is 
because, when costs are high and there are very few legal service providers, some 
workers and consumers may choose to ignore strong licensing standards and operate 
outside the law, where transactions are harder to enforce and unsavory practitioners can 
prey on victims who will be less likely to report problems due to a fear of being caught 
breaking the law (13). Williams uses the example of licenses that are required for taxi 
operators in New York City.  Many would-be minority taxi operators cannot afford the 
cost of licensing and associated regulations, and according to Williams, they turn to the 
black market and operate illegal cabs.  Williams believes the operation of illegal cabs by 
so many minority entrepreneurs is a direct response to the failure of the licensed taxi 
industry to provide adequate services to minority neighborhoods in New York City where 
demand is high (2011, 63).  Licensed operators often avoid working in areas with high 
crime rates and other areas which are less economically profitable than the central 
business district (64).  Yet, those who would work in the area are unable to afford the 




cost of licensing so they tend to operate illegally, which does not ensure that minority 
neighborhoods receive the best level of services. If people cannot afford the available 
services in some areas, they may forego them altogether and if needed things such as 
plumbing or electrical work are foregone, society may eventually bear a cost.
Effects on Individuals with Criminal Records
 In approximately half of all states, individuals can be denied various occupational 
licenses due to the presence of a criminal record, regardless of what type of crime was 
committed, when the conviction occurred, or whether it is relevant to the type of license 
sought.  Exclusions of individuals with criminal records may affect anywhere from 70 
million to 100 million individuals across the United States who have criminal records of 
some type (White House 2015). What is concerning to many authors such as Neily et. al. 
is that such exclusions disproportionately affect African American and Hispanic workers, 
who find themselves barred from many licensed occupations at increasing rates (2014).  
Also, in many instances, occupational licensing authorities consider arrests that never 
even led to charges or convictions when making a decision on issuing licenses.  Even in 
cases where licenses are issued to individuals with criminal records, licensing boards 
routinely take months to reach a decision and issue the license (White House 2015).
Rent Seeking by Groups Wishing to Be Licensed
Economic theory, as well as a great deal of the literature on occupational 
licensing, suggests that many licensing requirements have the effect of creating rents for 
existing practitioners in licensed occupations.  If a given state tends to routinely adopt
new occupational licensing policies, such as Texas, where over 500 different occupations 
are regulated, additional occupations likely become even more inclined to seek licensure.  




This leads to many different scenarios from industry groups spending resources to hire 
lobbyists to work through the licensing process to committee chairs and other influential 
policymakers being accused of favoritism by quickly moving licensing requirements for 
certain occupations and not others.  Just like with any other public policy issue, interest 
groups and lobbyists will be likely to manipulate the process to benefit their own interests 
if they have a chance to do so.
Political Economy of Occupational Licensing
Aside from protecting the health and safety of the public, an alternative 
explanation for the prevalence of occupational licensing is related to a theory of 
regulation in general that has evolved over time.  This is where industries and 
professional associations request regulation, draft potential legislation, support it as it 
moves through the political process, and tries to make sure it is operated for the benefit of 
the industry or groups.  Friedman (1965) discussed this phenomenon in terms of the 
earlier mentioned time period of 1890-1910 when occupational licensing began to expand 
more rapidly in the United States.  He believes that, during this time period, “friendly 
licensing” grew at an exceptionally rapid rate.  He describes friendly licensing as that 
which was suggested and drafted by groups within the affected occupation (497).  
According to Friedman, the success of licensing policies usually depended on the absence 
of a strong and coherent group working together to oppose licensing (500).  Friedman 
identified farriers, barbers, real estate agents, undertakers, embalmers, and funeral 
directors as well organized groups that became licensed at various places in the United 
States during this time period, usually through friendly licensing legislation (505).  This 
seems to be in line with other theories of interest groups which state that the best 




organized interest groups tend to be the most successful in the public policy process.  
Much in the way that Friedman (1965) described friendly licensing, Rottenberg described 
occupational licensing as a system where pleas are made to legislatures by new licensing 
statutes or stronger requirements by practitioners of the trade in question, not by the 
consumers (1962, 4).  For example, Rottenberg wrote about a single session of the New 
Jersey legislature where practitioners requested licensing requirements for bait fishing 
boats, beauty shops, chain stores, florists, insurance adjusters, photographers, and master 
painters.  In addition, Rottenberg stated that the draft proposals usually included 
grandfather clauses which exempted incumbent practitioners from requirements, making 
it likely that they would realize significant economic rents from the restrictions (6).  
Kleiner also recognizes that there is typically a once-and-for-all income gain that accrues 
to current members of an occupation who are grandfathered in and do not have to meet 
the newly established licensing standards (2000, 192). It stands to reason that any group 
who could successfully get a grandfather clause enacted for themselves in occupational 
licensing legislation would have an economic incentive to continually push for higher 
standards of entry for the occupation. Schlomach (2012) also discusses grandfather 
clauses, pointing to such policies as evidence that licensing advocates know they are 
overstating the importance of public safety.  He believes that if there is enough danger to 
health and safety from unlicensed practice of occupations to justify the enactment of 
licensing policies, that it does not make sense to exempt anyone, including current 
practitioners, from the requirements. Not only may costs for required training and 
meeting other required standards affect who may enter a profession, but practitioners 
must pay fees anytime an occupational license is due for renewal and, in many 




occupations, must complete continuing education requirements.  These costs are not only 
potentially burdensome to individuals seeking to enter an occupation, but may also be 
burdensome to current practitioners who must renew licenses while operating on small 
profit margins.  In a 2006 study, Kleiner stated that no branches of government have a 
strong incentive to oppose occupational licensing. This is because the fees generated 
from licensing and regulating an occupation are generally much higher than the costs of 
operating the licensing program.  Many states use the excess funds to help balance the 
budget or for small projects to earn favor of constituents that would not otherwise be 
possible without raising taxes, something that is often politically unpopular (18).  Kleiner 
also refers to increased licensing fees as a potential source of hidden taxes since states 
and localities can raise costs associated with licensing processes without widespread 
public backlash (2013, 220).  There may not even be backlash from current practitioners 
in an occupation who face increased fees.  If they can afford the fees and truly wish to 
erect higher barriers to entry to limit the ability of new competitors to enter the market,
they will likely not challenge increased fees.
Curiously enough, occupational licensing policies can sometimes lead to price 
fixing schemes where regulated occupations are forced to offer subsidies to certain 
classes of consumers.  While it may seem reasonable to believe that practitioners would 
not like limits on what they can charge for services, there may be more to consider.  For 
instance, many municipal governments around the United States enact occupational 
licensing requirements for taxi drivers and, more recently, for newer ride sharing services
that have developed in recent years.  In some states, such as Texas, this type of licensing 
policy goes back for nearly a century.  As Steen explains, some city councils around the 




state as early as the 1920s passed ordinances specifying licensing requirements for 
individuals who operated taxis (2012, 135).  Also, in some instances, city governments 
placed a cap on fees charged by taxi drivers to take passengers to certain destinations, and 
it was known that non-compliance with the fee caps could result in the loss of a license 
(142).  By the 1940s, some municipalities also had passed ordinances requiring licenses 
for chauffeurs within their corporate limits (360).  In cases like this, occupational 
licensing policies operate as a cross-subsidy.  A fixed price for taxi services might mean 
that even when there may be a high demand for taxi services and a low supply, 
individuals would not pay a different price than they would at any other time.  For 
instance, in the market, a midnight taxi ride when only one company was operating and 
weather conditions were icy might command a higher price and a higher value to a 
consumer than a mid-day ride during nice weather when multiple companies were 
operating.  However, a price fixing scheme would not allow that market adjustment to 
happen.  In that way, the cross subsidy comes by enacting a fee cap, or hidden tax, on taxi 
licensees which is allocated as a subsidy to individuals who would otherwise pay more 
for taxi rides.  While it may seem unusual that taxi operators would be supportive of 
having their fees cap, they are less concerned if policymakers are limiting market entry 
for other taxi services.  Incumbent practitioners would often rather have more guaranteed 
business at a lower price than be able to charge higher prices but, in doing so, be forced 
to compete with more operators.  In this example, policymakers may be maximizing their 
own utility as they may be supported by the taxi industry for erecting barriers to entry but 
may also remind their constituents that taxi services are affordable due to legislation that 




they passed.  Therefore, economic gains and losses may be distributed in a way that will 
be of maximum political benefit to policymakers.
Existing Empirical Studies
Some empirical work has been conducted to study the cost of licensing in relation 
to the price of services paid by consumers.  A review of empirical studies indicates that 
licensing and other occupational regulations tend to raise the cost of service in a wide 
range of professions (Herrington and Treber 2009; Kleiner and Kurdle 2000).  Also, 
various studies have found increases in practitioner incomes associated with occupational 
licensing (Herrington and Treber 2009; Kleiner 2013; Kleiner and Park 2011). Other 
studies of occupational licensing, especially policies enacted at the local government 
level, do not find the same association.  However, local and state licensing requirements 
combined to tend to lead to increases in practitioner incomes (Kleiner 2013). It is also 
common for practitioner wages to increase when demand for a service is inelastic 
(Kleiner and Park 2011). Table 1, on the next page, summarizes the findings of nine 
different existing empirical studies on practitioner incomes and the prices of services.




Table 1: Occupational Licensing, Practitioner Incomes, and Prices of Services
Study Occupation Finding
Kleiner and Kurdle Dental Hygienists Independent practice authority for dental 
hygienists is associated with a -26% 
employment growth rate for dentists and 
a 10% increase in the earnings of 
hygienists.  States with stricter licensing 
requirements that do not allow autonomy 
for dental hygienists reallocate $1.34 
billion per year from hygienists to 
dentists.
Kleiner and Kurdle (2000) Dentists Stricter licensing requirements are 
associated with a slower growth in the 
amount of dentists practicing and there 
are higher prices for services and higher 
hourly earnings for dentists.
Herrington and Treber (2009) Interior Designers Licensing laws diminish low cost 
competitors and remaining firms and 
designers tend to charge higher prices.
Licensing raises the earnings of full-time 
interior designers by $1600 per year and 
interior design firms earned $72,000 per 
year more per 10,000 people in states 
with licensing requirements.
Kleiner and Park (2011) Electricians Demand tends to be inelastic, and stricter 
licensing requirements tend to increase 
wages. 
Kleiner (2013) Barbers Licensing requirements were found to 
increase wages by as much as 22%.
Kleiner (2013) Electricians Local licensing requirements in addition 
to state licensing requirements increase 
practitioner incomes by as much as 12%.  
Kleiner (2013) Massage Therapists Licensing requirements were found to 
increase hourly earnings by 16% and to 
reduce the amount of practitioners per 
capita.
Kleiner (2013) Radiologic Technologists In states with licensing requirements, 
earnings were about 6.9% greater than in 
states without licensing.
Kleiner (2013) Real Estate Professionals Stricter licensing requirements in 
Massachusetts were found to reduce the 
number of active agents and increase the 
incomes of the remainder by up to 17%.
Other literature has examined the effect of occupational licensing requirements on 
overall incomes in licensed occupations, without looking at specific occupations.  As 
competition diminishes and costs to consumers rise, Kleiner (2011) found that average 
practitioner income, regardless of the occupation, tends to rise with licensing 




requirements.  In fact, he estimates that licensing at the state level is associated with an 
earnings growth of 17 percent over similar unlicensed occupations.  Also, state licensing 
requirements which are combined with some type of local or federal business regulation 
in the same occupation are associated with an earnings growth of 25 percent (19).
Another valid question concerning occupational licensing policies is whether they 
lead to better quality.  Since eliminating poor quality service providers is often a 
justification for enacting licensing policies, it stands to reason that policies that have good 
outcomes would lead to better quality services. Kleiner surmised that licensing can raise 
quality within an industry by restrictive entry requirements tend to diminish the number 
of less qualified or less motivated individuals who could enter the occupation.  This 
increases the average quality of workers’ skills in an occupation (2011, 7). Larsen (2013) 
and Shapiro (1986) examined the quality of teachers when stricter licensing requirements 
were enacted.  He found that some requirements for licensing, such as a the requirement 
to pass a test in the subject matter an individual sought to teach, did improve teacher 
quality.  However, there was not a statistically significant impact on the average teacher 
input quality when more restrictive licensing requirements were implemented.  Stricter 
licensing requirements were found to be associated with an increase in teacher 
qualifications, but only at the wealthiest school districts, measured by those with a lower 
percentage of students qualifying for a free lunch.  The effect of higher qualifications 
decreases as income decreases and in the poorest districts, stronger regulations are 
associated with a statistically insignificant decrease in teacher qualifications (Larsen 
2013, 27-28).  Larsen’s work found support for a prediction by Shapiro which stated that 
stronger licensing requirements would improve quality for higher income areas but not 




lower income areas (1986, 30).  Since stronger licensing requirements have been known 
to restrict supply and increase wages, Larsen believes the poorest school districts still find 
ways to substitute away from licensed professionals, which would lead to lower quality 
services (31).  Lower income schools are also less likely to retain teachers during supply 
shortages, which could lead them to increase class sizes or hire emergency certified 
teachers who have not yet met all licensing requirements (32).  This is consistent with 
Larsen’s hypothesis that stronger licensing requirements can lead to larger class sizes in 
order to have enough qualified professionals (36).  Wiswall touches on this matter, noting 
that about 15 percent of new teachers are working without having met some or all 
licensing requirements (2013, 4). Overall, Wiswall believes that higher licensing costs 
reduce teacher labor supply, reduce average teacher quality, and increase the average 
length of teaching careers (7).  This is because stronger licensing requirements reduce the 
proportion of the population choosing to teach (21) but many people in this category 
would have likely not taught for their entire careers.  Without licensing, people might be 
more likely to leave teaching for another occupation or begin teaching later in their career 
after working in another profession..  Wiswall feels that if states wish to recruit teachers 
with high levels of general skills in addition to subject area knowledge, they should relax 
licensing requirements.  This, he feels, is one of the few ways to improve average teacher 
quality without large pay raises, which also tend to bring in more qualified candidates 
(49).  While there is evidence to suggest that licensing does increase the lower tail of 
teacher quality, stated public policy goals usually have nothing to do with only the lower 
tail of quality.




Kleiner and Park studied occupational licensing for electricians, who were 
licensed by 45 states at the time of their paper (2011, 5).  Much like the work of Larsen 
(2013) with teacher licensing requirements, Kleiner and Park believe that stronger 
licensing requirements could eliminate the lower part of the quality distribution for 
electricians (2011, 8).  Despite their belief that lower quality workers might not enter the 
profession under stronger restrictions, the two authors found that the impact of 
occupational regulation for death and injuries in this potentially hazardous occupation is 
statistically insignificant (19), possibly pointing to the fact that tougher licensing laws do 
not always fulfill their intended purpose.  At the very least, this finding may point to the 
fact that some issues that truly involve health and safety of the public are so extreme in 
nature that causes and effects are outside the scope of the stated protections of 
occupational licensing.
Carpenter (2011) conducted a field experiment on the influence of the licensing of 
florists on the quality of floral arrangements.  At the time of his study, Louisiana was the 
only state with full licensing requirements for florists.  Experts from that state assessed 
the quality of floral arrangements and found that licensed florists did not produce better 
quality work that non-licensed florists in Texas, where the same products had a lower 
cost.  Summers (2007) found that states with stricter dental licensing laws had the highest 
incidence of poor dental hygiene and states with stricter optometry licensing laws 
reported higher rates of blindness and other uncorrected vision problems. Williams 
(2011) found negative effects on the quality of services provided to minorities in the 
public.




Shown below, Table 2 summarizes eight different studies which focus on the 
relationship between occupational licensing and service quality.
Table 2: Occupational Licensing and Service Quality
Study Occupation Finding
Shapiro (1986) Teachers Stricter licensing requirements improve 
quality for higher income schools, but not for 
lower income schools.
Summers (2007) Dentists States with stricter licensing laws had the 
highest incidence of poor dental hygiene. 
Summers (2007) Optometrists States with stricter licensing laws had the 
highest incidence of blindness and 
uncorrected vision problems.
Carpenter (2011) Florists Licensed florists did not produce a better 
quality product than non-licensed florists.
Kleiner and Park (2011) Electricians Licensing requirements had a statistically 
insignificant impact on the amount of deaths 
and injuries associated with electrical work.
Williams (2011) Taxi Drivers Despite high demand, the licensed taxi 
drivers in New York City provide poor 
service to low income areas and areas with 
high minority populations.
Larsen (2013) Teachers Licensing requirements for passing a subject 
matter test improved the input quality of 
teachers.  Other restrictive licensing 
requirements did not produce a statistically 
significant effect on teacher quality.  
Wiswall (2013) Teachers Stricter licensing retirements reduce the 
supply of teachers, reduce the quality of 
teachers, and lengthen teaching careers.
This dissertation seeks to examine the political economy of occupational 
licensing, specifically the reasons that determine which licensing proposals become law 
and the extent to which industry interest groups work through the political process to 
support such proposals.  There are some existing studies for this area of occupational 
licensing, and even some court decisions that found licensing requirements were enacted 
to the benefit of a specific group without helping the greater interest of society.  In Wyeth 
v. Thomas, Benjamin Wyeth had been an undertaker for 46 years when a regulatory board 
in Massachusetts passed a rule requiring all undertakers to be licensed embalmers.  The 




court saw no good reason for such a rule and stated that it “did not carry…strong 
presumptions of constitutionality” (Friedman 1965, 512).  A similar law was passed in 
New York in 1905 and was challenged in the case of People v. Ringe.  The New York 
Court of appeals recognized the state’s regulatory power, but felt that it went too far by 
requiring that the jobs of undertaker and embalmer be done by only one person.  The 
court believed that “…the act in question was conceived and promulgated in the interest 
of those engaged in the undertaking business…”  The court also stated that the provisions 
interfered with the “common-law right to engage in a lawful business,” and considered 
the requirement an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with constitutional rights 
(513). In 1901, the decision in Bessette v. People struck down an Illinois law with
licensing requirements for farriers.  The court stated that it was impossible to understand 
how the law promoted the health, safety, or welfare of a society.  Without aims to those 
ends, the court stated that no law regulating any occupation could be sustained.  The 
court felt that if such an act was valid, the legislature would be free to regulate the 
employment of any citizen in any occupation simply by implementing licensing 
requirements (517).
Wallace finds that interest groups seeking licensing requirements usually field 
legislators to be friendly or without an opinion, and that the only threat during the 
legislative process would come from another professional group which feels that a bill 
threatens their interests (1972, 47).  In other words, licensing requirements do not draw 
much scrutiny from those outside the profession unless a “turf war” of sorts might be 
sensed by practitioners in another occupation.  Harrington and Treber studied the effects 
of occupational licensing requirements on the earnings of interior designers, an 




occupation where stricter regulations are normally pushed by the American Society of 
Interior Designers, or ASID.  ASID representatives and other proponents of stricter 
regulations for the interior design professions often say the laws are necessary to protect 
vulnerable consumers from unqualified designers (2009, 2).  ASID’s endorsement of 
stronger regulation in its industry has been taking place for over 30 years (Carpenter et al. 
2011, 29) despite the fact that since 1907, only 52 lawsuits have been filed against 
interior designers in the entire United States, the majority of which involved contract 
disputes and not damages that represented a menace to public health or safety (Texas 
House Committee on Government Reform 2009, 50). State representatives in Texas 
opposing a 2013 proposal for deregulation of interior designers used various arguments 
including their observation that many licensed practitioners want licensing laws to remain 
in place.  Despite a recommendation from the Texas Sunset Commission to deregulate 
the occupation, the 2013 legislative session actually ended with more regulations in place 
for an interior design license. In addition to the initial requirements, individuals now must 
submit a complete set of fingerprints and have a background check before becoming 
being approved for licensure.  Also, the grandfather clause was removed (Texas 
Legislative Council, 2013).
Sometimes, it seems that policymakers and the public are largely indifferent to 
licensing proposals.  Wallace states that the general public is usually not even interested 
enough to participate in the process, so the legislative process ends up being only a minor 
barrier to the enactment of new licensing requirements (1972, 48).  Buchholz believes 
that policymakers do not necessarily see all licensing restrictions that are passed as a 
good thing, but they feel that they might as well give in to industries if the public does 




not care enough to provide input (1989, 253).   Summers found that regulatory boards, 
often at least partly made up of practitioners may have a desire to use the licensing 
system to help incumbent practitioners while levying punishments on those who work 
without a license (2007, 11). 
The Texas House Committee on Government Reform’s 2009 report notes that 
other industries, such as landscape irrigators have sought to enhance their own regulation 
(48).  Also, at the time the committee was holding hearings on the interim charge of 
studying occupational licensing, 15 landscape architects appeared to testify at a hearing 
to defend and promote the continued regulation of their industry (53).  Carpenter et al. 
explain that practitioners are just as likely to oppose deregulation as they are to request 
friendly regulation.  In 2011, Florida considered legislation to end licensing for 20 
occupations including auctioneers, talent agents, television picture tube salesmen, 
ballroom dance teachers, interior designers, and hair braiders.  However, the bill failed 
partially due to strong industry resistance (30).
While the findings previously discussed to explain many important things about 
the political economy of occupational licensing, they do not explain the exact things for 
which this dissertation is intended, as this dissertation focuses on why some occupations 
become licensed and others do not. The previously mentioned work largely discusses 
occupations either seek licensing which ultimately passes or that are working to keep 
licensing requirements that are already in place.  It does not address licensing proposals 
for other occupations that fail to become law. Carpenter et al. touch on this notion, 
stating that the fact that occupations proposed for licensing in one state that might be 
unlicensed elsewhere should suggest to state policymakers that stated health and safety 




risks are not truly present or that other market-related mechanisms can work effectively 
(2011, 34).  However, Carpenter’s work does not follow any specific occupation in this 
category through the process of proposed licensure to determine why certain ones will 
become licensed.  There is some mention of the fact that occupations posing more of a 
health and safety threat to the public are more likely to become licensed, but there 
appears to be a lack of empirical study showing whether or not that is true. There are, 
however, findings that suggest that whether or not the risk level of the public is the initial 
reason for licensure, higher risk does not necessarily translate into stronger licensing 
standards once an occupation becomes licensed.  Carpenter et al. surmise that the 
difficulty of entering an occupation often does not line up with the public health risk it 
poses.  They studied 66 occupations such as interior designers, barbers, cosmetologists, 
manicurists, and many contractor designations and found that all had more burdensome 
requirements than emergency medical technicians (EMTs).  The authors found that the 
average cosmetologist throughout the United States was required to spend 372 days in 
training to qualify for a license, while the average EMT needed only 33 days (2011, 29).  
Katsuyama also studied similar issues, concluding that he found no reason that barbers 
should routinely require more training than paramedics, who deal with life and death 
situations (2010, 570).
Other work has focused on multiple occupations, but those that were closely 
related such as Graddy’s (1991a) study of health-related occupations where she measured 
characteristics of several occupations and the political effectiveness of related 
professional associations.  In Graddy’s work, both public interest and political 
effectiveness of professional associations were significant in explaining occupational 




licensing.  Liability insurance premiums were used by Graddy as an indicator of the level 
of risk to the public that a given occupation poses.  However, Graddy only presented 
findings for a few closely related occupations.  
While there are many studies that deal with various facets of occupational 
licensing, there do not seem to be any that have examined a wide range of occupations in 
a single state by following both successful and unsuccessful licensing proposals through 
the policymaking process.  To expand on studies in this area of public administration, this 
dissertation aims to study a wider range of occupations in Texas that have seen both 
success and failure with licensing proposals.  There is also a great deal of speculation 
about the effects of occupational licensing on both the professionals in a given industry 
and on consumers.  Much of the speculation does not appear to have been studied 
academically or empirically, despite the fact that occupational licensing affects the 
employment of nearly 30 percent of the labor force in the United States and may impact 
virtually all consumers at some point or another.  This dissertation will present research 
that expands on this topic.






Part 1: Case Studies on Occupational Licensing in Texas: Anesthesiology Assistants, 
Associate Auctioneers, Forensic Analysts, Foundation Repair Contractors, Roofing 
Contractors, and Veterinary Technicians
For the first portion of this study on occupational licensing, information will be 
used from six case studies on occupational licensing proposals that have been considered 
in Texas over the past four years.  Legislation requiring occupational licensing ultimately 
passed for three of these occupations: associate auctioneers, forensic analysts, and 
veterinary technicians.  Legislation was not successful to license anesthesiology 
assistants, foundation repair contractors, or roofing contractors.  These six case studies 
should provide valuable information on how politics is intertwined in the process of 
occupational licensing.  While six case studies may not provide conclusive evidence on 
how the licensing process always works, by selecting a wide range of occupations as well 
as those with both successful and unsuccessful licensing proposals, they should present 
significant information on how the process works- something that could be expanded 
upon in future studies.  Although various interested parties often discuss occupational 
licensing in terms of the political forces involved, there is very little, if any, work to 
describe the process in a specific state.  The Texas House Committee on Government 
Reform did, in 2009, put out a report on occupational licensing in the state.  At that time, 
the committee was chaired by now retired State Representative Bill Callegari, a frequent 




and vocal critic of occupational licensing polices.  The report provides some insight to 
various proposals considered in the state around that time, but it was more concerned 
with the merits of existing licensing requirements as opposed to also considering tracing 
failed proposals through the process and comparing them to successful proposals.
The case studies are also intended to provide some context to statistical methods 
that are also used, which examine the degree to which political participation by interest 
groups is associated with the likelihood of successful licensing proposals for associated 
occupations.  The case studies suggest that participation should be studied over several 
legislative sessions, as many similar proposals have been made multiple times before 
passing or, before even coming to a vote.  
These six case studies have been formulated from official information kept in the 
records of the Texas Legislature.  The Texas Legislature maintains official records such 
as when legislation was considered for committee hearings, how far the legislation 
moved in the process, and lists of individuals and groups registered to support or oppose 
the legislation.  These items were studied, as were video archives of each committee 
hearing and floor debate on the legislation being studied.  Direct quotations from these 
individuals have been properly attributed, and other source information is listed in the 
bibliography. The Institutional Research Board (IRB) determined that this research 
protocol was exempt from their oversight, since human research participants were not 
used.  The IRB protocol exemption report is included as an appendix to this dissertation.
Part 2: Empirical Study of Occupational Licensing in Texas
The competing theories of regulation (public interest and regulatory capture), 
discussed earlier in this work, suggest that an empirical analysis can be conducted.  If 




policymakers do indeed regulate occupations for the protection of the public, then 
occupations that pose a greater risk to a member of the public utilizing the service or to 
an uninvolved third party should be the most likely to have licensing requirements.  
However, if occupational licensing is beneficial mainly to current practitioners in an 
occupation, then the likelihood of occupational licensing requirements in a given 
occupation should be a function of the level to which related interest groups are 
politically organized.  The theories could both be true, and complimentary of each other, 
as the public may benefit from protection of health and safety, while practitioners in 
licensed occupations also benefit by being able to protect their interests.
The literature review suggests that occupational licensing proposals are unpopular 
by groups who see themselves as being negatively affected.  It stands to reason that if 
occupational licensing raises the cost of service, then anyone who is likely to hire 
individuals in the occupation in question may oppose licensing requirements.  According 
to Graddy (1991b), occupations where many practitioners work for large firms are less 
likely to face licensing requirements since large firms can organize more easily than 
consumers in order to oppose licensing proposals. This is somewhat illustrated in the 
case studies presented in this dissertation, as most groups registering in support of the 
occupational licensing legislation that was the subject of this study were interest groups, 
not businesses or firms that actually hired practitioners in the occupations.  Because of 
this, the likelihood of an occupation facing licensing requirements should vary inversely 
with the level at which opponents are organized.




This study is driven by the following research question: Does occupational 
licensing serve to protect both the public and the interest of practitioners in licensed 
occupations?
H1o- There is no relationship between occupational licensing requirements and the risk 
posed to the public by individuals engaging in the occupation.
H1a- Occupations that pose a risk to the public are more likely to have occupational 
licensing requirements.
H2o- There is no relationship between occupational licensing requirements and the 
interests of practitioners.
H2a- There is a relationship between occupational licensing requirements and the 
interests of practitioners.
H3o- There is no relationship between licensing requirements found for occupations in 
other states and the likelihood of the same occupation requiring licensing in Texas.
H3a- The more states that require licensing in a specific occupation, the more likely the 
occupation is to be licensed in Texas.
H4o- There is no relationship between the organizational structure in which practitioners 
work and whether occupational licensing is required.
H4a- Firms are more likely than individuals to oppose licensing requirements for their 
employees, therefore, practitioners in fields employed mainly by firms are less likely to 
be licensed.
These hypotheses are supported theoretically by several authors who suggest that 
licensing can serve a dual purpose and empirically by Graddy (1991a, 1991b).  Therefore, 
the likelihood that an occupation will be licensed can be modeled in the following way:






L = the likelihood that an occupation has licensing requirements;
R = the risk posed to the public by individuals engaging in the occupation;
S = the political influence of the groups supporting licensing requirements; and
O = the political influence of the groups opposing licensing requirements.
N = number of states requiring licensing for the occupation.
T = Organizational structure of occupation (employed as individuals, employed 
by firms, or a mixture).
Methodology used in this dissertation tests the above model using data from the State of 
Texas.  It will help answer the question of how the observed patterns associated with 
occupational licensing are correlated.
Dependent Variable: Licensing Requirement
An occupation either has licensing requirements in Texas, or it does not.  A data 
set of 43 occupations has been compiled, of which 28 are licensed by the State of Texas 
according to the 2008 publication, Occupational Regulation in Texas: Occupational 
Licenses and Statutory Penalties for Violations Relating to Occupational Licenses. As a 
supplement to determining which of the 43 occupations require licensing in Texas,
information from legislative sources has been added on occupations that became licensed 
since 2008. This dataset was compiled based on occupations studied nationwide by the 
Institute of Justice in their publication License to Work. The 43 occupations were 
selected from the publication in order to represent a variety of occupation types. Having 
a variety of occupation types represented in the dataset is important to this study in order 




to study factors that might lead to occupational licensing, regardless of the occupation 
type. In addition, with some of the occupations requiring licensing in Texas and others 
not requiring licensing, meaningful analysis can be made among the occupations.  The 
selected occupations also have a range of reported accident rates.  Lobbying expenditures 
also vary greatly, as some of the selected occupations had no groups spending money on 
lobbying while groups representing other occupations spent as much as $310,000 during 
a legislative session. Individuals working in some of the occupations tend to be self-
employed, individuals in other occupations selected tend to be employed by firms, while 
the final set of occupations represents those where individuals tend to be employed both 
for themselves and by firms.  Having a variety of organizational structures for 
occupations is also important to this study. Table 3, shown below, lists the occupations 
that were selected for this study and the current licensing status of the occupations in 
Texas.





Air conditioning contractors Yes Locksmiths Yes
Anesthesiology assistants No Makeup artists No
Animal breeders Yes Massage therapists Yes
Animal trainers Yes Milk samplers Yes
Athletic coaches Yes Mobile home installers Yes
Athletic trainers Yes Opticians Yes
Auctioneers Yes Painters No
Bartenders No Plumbers Yes
Behavior analysts No Process servers Yes
Carpenters No Radiology assistants No
Child care workers Yes Roofing contractors No
Construction contractors No Salvage vehicle dealers Yes
Crane operators No Security alarm installers Yes
Door repair contractors Yes Security guards (private) Yes
Drywall installation contractors No Shampooers Yes
Electricians Yes Speech language pathologists Yes
Fishers (commercial) Yes Taxi drivers No
Forensic analysts Yes Taxidermists No
Foundation repair contractors No Travel guides Yes
Hair braiders No Veterinary assistants Yes
Interior designers Yes Water well drillers Yes
Landscape architects Yes




Risk to the Public Posed by the Occupation
If everything else is equal, the occupations presenting the highest risks to the 
public should be the most likely to have licensing requirements. However, it is hard to 
measure public “danger” posed by an occupation, just like it is difficult to measure 
service “quality” when attempting to determine whether occupational licensing improves 
quality.  This study, slightly different from Graddy’s (1991a) use of liability insurance 
premiums, uses what should be the most accurate and up to date measure possible for 
“danger:” the rate of reported accidents for individuals in selected occupations within 
Texas.
Political Influence
According to literature found on occupational regulation, interest groups often use 
the political and policymaking processes to advance their goals of obtaining licensure in 
their occupations.  In most cases, the literature does not detail the methods by which 
groups seek to influence public policy.  However, the the literature generally indicates
that groups seeking licensing requirements in an occupation choose to exert political 
influence through state-level professional associations.  The literature does mention union 
influence in the process, but since Texas is a right-to-work state and the unions that do 
exist are very weak, this study will focus on professional associations. Therefore, 
information has been collected in regards to the professional associations representing 
each of the associations in this sample: the amount of money spent on lobbying by these 
associations.  It is expected that the amount of money spent will be related to the group’s 
ability to engage in activities to support occupational licensing legislation.




Some literature suggests that one proxy for political influence of interest groups 
could be overall levels of campaign contributions distributed by a group, or at least 
contributions distributed to key legislators who serve on committees with jurisdiction 
over occupational licensing legislation.  However, campaign contributions were not used 
in this study because interest groups representing businesses or workers may have other 
reasons for contributing as well such as influencing particular types of tax policies, 
economic development policies, and other things of interest in the business community.  
Therefore, it would be virtually impossible to point to a campaign contribution with the 
intended purpose of encouraging a legislator to support occupational licensing policies as 
opposed to some other type of policy supported by the group offering the contribution.
Money spent directly on lobbying is a better measure of political strength because 
lobbying focuses on specific issues whereas campaign contributions may be given 
regardless of a legislator’s stance on specific issues.
Data regarding spending on lobbying were gathered by using a survey of Texas 
professional organizations.  The survey worked in the following way:
1. The Encyclopedia of Associations was studied in order to find Texas 
organizations representing the occupations in the data set.
2. An Internet search was conducted to search for any professional
associations that might have been missed.
3. All of the professional associations that were identified in the two searches 
were searched in an online database containing official records maintained by the Texas 
Ethics Commission.  Organizations are required to report all funds spent on lobbying to 
the Texas Ethics Commission for each legislative session.  In instances where a 




professional organization was not located in either search, the spending of the 
organization was described as zero.  With the methods of searching for organizations that 
were utilized, it is possible that some professional organizations were missed.  That 
should, however, have a limited effect on the study, as groups that couldn’t be located 
either in the Encyclopedia of Associations or by an internet search likely spends very 
little on lobbying and has very little political influence.
Number of Other States Requiring Licensing in the Occupation
One thing that is noteworthy in much of the literature regarding occupational 
licensure is that several hundred occupations have licensing requirements in at least one 
state, but very few occupations have licensing requirements in all states.  For each 
occupation in this study, the Career One Stop web site, sponsored by the United States 
Department of Labor, was used to determine which states require licensing. A summary 
of the licensure status of the occupations in the dataset is presented below in Table 4.
Table 4: Licensure of Occupations in the Data Set
Occupations licensed by 50 states and DC 0
Occupations licensed by 41 to 50 states 6
Occupations licensed by 31 to 40 states 11
Occupations licensed by 21 to 30 states 7
Occupations licensed by 11 to 20 states 9
Occupations licensed by 2 to 10 states 9
Occupations licensed by only 1 state 0
Occupations not licensed in any state 1
This dissertation uses a methodology introduced by Graddy (1991a, 1991b), 
which classifies practitioners of occupations into one of three categories of organizational 




structure, depending on how they are most likely to be employed.  An occupation is 
classified in group 1 if most of the practitioners are employed by individual members of 
the general public.  An occupation is classified in group 2 if practitioners tend to work for
a mixture of individual members of the general public and firms.  Occupations are 
classified in group 3 if most of the practitioners work for firms.  As Table 5 shows, the 
occupations in the dataset are divided in the following manner:
Table 5: Organizational Structure of Occupations




Organizational Structure of Occupations
Graddy’s belief, which is also shared in this dissertation, is that firms will be more 
likely than individual members of the public in organizing to oppose the enactment of 
occupational licensing legislation.  From the public interest theory of occupational 
licensing, it might be said that practitioners who are employed by firms are less likely to 
have licensing requirements because firms are more effective than consumers at learning 
information and determining the quality of service a worker is providing.  If this was the 
case, also keeping with the public interest theory, it could be said that there is less of a 
risk to the public when a practitioner is employed by a firm (since the firm would be 
better at gathering information and determining service quality), therefore, the occupation 
would be less likely to have licensing requirements. While this may seem reasonable, it 
is unlikely.  For this to be true, the main purpose of occupational licensing requirements 




would be to provide information to the public, a notion that is not supported in this 
dissertation.  The literature clearly shows that any benefits of occupational licensing in 
regards to information could be gained through other, less restrictive regulatory programs 
such as certification, registration, or even private programs operated by trade 
associations.  Under one of these alternate policies, practitioners in an occupation would 
meet requirements similar to what they meet for occupational licensing requirements, but 
the difference in using certification or registration would be that some would likely 
choose to meet the requirements and some would not.  An individual or firm hiring a 
practitioner in an occupation could then choose whether they wanted the information 
provided by a certification or registration and if they did, they would be able to make the 
choice and, if applicable, pay the premium associated with their choice.  In this alternate 
model, everyone involved would be no worse off and some would be better off because 
they might have a choice of more service providers, more price ranges, and other things 
upon which consumers routinely make decisions.
Also, the case studies presented in this dissertation do not provide any support for 
the assumption that individual members of the public demand occupational licensing 
requirements in order to be able to obtain better information.  In fact, individual members 
of the public and groups representing consumers did not play a major role in any of the 
instances of occupational licensing reviewed in the case studies.  In the few instances 
where consumer groups were involved, they were far from the most active supporters of 
licensing requirements and provided very general support as opposed to specific 
examples of consumer harm and how harm could be alleviated by information provided 
in occupational licensing programs. Therefore, this dissertation proceeds with the 




position that the main difference between individual members of the public and firms
when it comes to occupational licensing is their level of political organization.
Table 6, shown below, summarizes the independent variables for the statistical 
tests of occupations in Texas and shows the sources of the data.
Table 6: Independent Variables and Data Sources
Variable Data Source
Funds spent on lobbying by trade association Texas Ethics Commission
Accident rates Bureau of Labor Statistics
Number of states licensing the occupation Career One Stop web site, sponsored by the United 
States Department of Labor
Organizational structure of the occupation
(1 = employed by individual members of the public,
2 = mixed, 3 = employed by firms)
Assigned Values (1, 2, 3)
Part Three: Empirical Analysis of Occupational Licensing Across the United States
It is widely acknowledged in the literature that most occupations with licensing 
requirements do not have such requirements in all 50 states.  Therefore, many 
occupations with very strict requirements in one state may be freely entered by 
practitioners who meet no specific legal requirements in other states.  This part of the 
analysis singles out a specific occupation, behavior analysts, in seeking to explain why an 
occupation has licensing requirements in some states but not in others.  The economic 
theory of regulation suggests that behavior analysts will organize at the state level to seek 
occupational licensing requirements for their profession.  At the same time, groups 
opposed to occupational licensing requirements, (such as psychological associations and 
counseling associations in Texas) will organize to oppose licensing requirements.  This
section will seek to determine the organized political strength of behavior analysts at the 
state level compared to the organized political strength of psychological associations and 




counseling associations in conjunction with whether or not occupational licensing 
legislation is passed.
Behavior analysts were chosen for the analysis in this chapter for several reasons. 
First, licensing requirements for behavior analysts are relatively new, with the first 
legislation being passed in 2009 in Nevada and Oklahoma, so it should be relatively easy 
to find recent data for this occupation.  The distribution of new occupational licensing 
laws since that time has been spread relatively evenly over the past six years.  The most 
recent states to pass occupational licensing legislation for behavior analysts were Hawaii, 
Mississippi, and Utah, Vermont, and Washington, which all passed their requirements in 
their 2015 legislative sessions. Table 7, on the next page, lists the states with licensing 
requirements for behavior analysts, along with the year in which the requirement was first 
enacted for each state. As of August 2015, behavior analysts have occupational 
licensing requirements in just less than half of all states (24), so it should be possible to 
compare states with licensing requirements to those without.  Secondly, with groups 
active across the United States both in support of licensure for behavior analysts and in 
opposition to the licensing proposals, it seems that policymakers are hearing from people 
on both sides of the issue and are not making decisions solely based on one side.  Finally, 
the occupation of behavior analysts is not different from one geographic area to the next, 
nor is there any part of the United States where behavior analysts do not tend to work.  
While the demand for the services of behavior analysts may differ slightly from state to 
state, there are a number of practitioners available in every state.  Although behavior 
analysts were not the subject of Texas case studies presented in this dissertation, there 




was a recent attempt for occupational licensing in Texas which failed, and provided some 
insight into who the likely supporters and opponents were for such legislation.
Table 7: Year that Occupational Licensing Laws Were Passed for Behavior Analysts
Alabama 2014 Nevada 2009
Alaska 2014 New York 2014
Arizona 2010 Ohio 2013
Hawaii 2015 Oklahoma 2009
Kansas 2014 Oregon 2013
Kentucky 2010 Rhode Island 2012
Louisiana 2013 Tennessee 2014
Maryland 2014 Utah 2015
Massachusetts 2014 Virginia 2012
Missouri 2010 Vermont 2015
Mississippi 2015 Washington 2015
North Dakota 2011 Wisconsin 2010
The statistical model driving this chapter is much the same as the previous 
statistical model studying various occupations in Texas, but a vector of state-specific 
variables has been added that may help explain why a state legislature chooses to require 
occupational licensing for behavior analysts.  This section of the chapter is driven by the 
hypothesis H2a that the outcome of whether or not behavior analysts are licensed reflects 
the political organization of a state’s behavior analysts, the political organization of 
psychologists in the state, the political organization of counselors in the state, and also 
certain political preferences that vary across states.  For example, some states are 
wealthier, larger, or more politically conservative or liberal than other states.  These are 
all things which are likely to be reflected in the outcomes of many different public policy 
decisions, and it stands to reason that these factors would affect the state’s likeliness to 
regulate an occupation.
Therefore, the statistical model for this section is:
L = L(S,O,V)





L = the likelihood that an occupation has licensing requirements;
S = the political influence of the groups supporting licensing requirements; and
O = the political influence of the groups opposing licensing requirements.
V = vector of state-specific characteristics that may explain the state’s likelihood 
of licensing an occupation.  These characteristics include demographic and 
political features of states that may be correlated with the likelihood of licensing 
requirements.
To proceed with this work, the assumption is made that unlicensed behavior 
analysts would pose the same risk to the public in all states.  It is also possible that the 
desire to pass occupational licensing legislation is driven by acts of incompetence that are 
publicized in a given state.  For example, House Bill 2703 was proposed in Texas to 
license behavior analysts in the 2015 legislative session, but it did not pass.  State 
Representative Matt Schaefer questioned the bill’s author, State Representative Ron 
Simmons, as to whether there were examples of harm caused by unlicensed behavior 
analysts.  Representative Simmons responded with an example of a school employee who 
was doing behavioral work with a child and unintentionally caused an injury to the child 
(Texas House of Representatives: May 14, 2015 Floor Session 2015). Regardless of 
incidents like this that may generate attention, it seems to be reasonable to believe that 
unlicensed behavior analysts are no more dangerous in Texas than they would be in 
Arkansas or Wisconsin. 
The question addressed in this section is best approached using a multinomial 
logit regression model. In order to examine why behavior analysts have occupational 
licensing requirements in some states and not others, the following variables will be used:





The enactment of occupational licensing requirements at the state level is the 
outcome of interest.  These data were compiled by the Association of Professional 
Behavior Analysts, a national group which, among other things, follows legal issues that 
affect its members.  As of August 2015, behavior analysts were licensed in 24 states.
Risk Posed to the Public by the Occupation
As mentioned previously in this chapter, this model assumes that non-licensed 
behavior analysts present an equal danger to the public in each state.  Therefore, the 
model does not contain a variable that measures specific risk by state for behavior 
analysts.  While this data in regards to incompetence shown by unlicensed behavior 
analysts would be very helpful, it would be extremely difficult to collect since detailed 
public records on performance are not usually collected until an occupation has licensing 
requirements and until a state legislature directs a licensing authority to collect such 
information.  
Political Influence and Organization
This model uses the number of behavior analysts in the state who were members 
of the Association of Professional Behavior Analysts in 2008 as a measure of political 
organization. On the next page, Table 8 shows that every state was represented with at 
least six members in the Association of Professional Behavior Analysts. Since the 
Association of Professional Behavior Analysts is a national association, a better measure 
would likely be to have data on the membership of each state’s organization of behavior 
analysts in 2008.  However, it seems reasonable that the state-level membership in the 
Association of Professional Behavior Analysts would be highly correlated with the 




number of practitioners who also belong to their state professional association.  The
hypothesis is that the level of political organization will be positively correlated with the 
licensure of behavior analysts in each state.




Analysts, members in 
state
360 3239 (California) 6 (Wyoming)
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Political Opposition to Occupational Licensing
As previously discussed, legislative records indicate that the Texas Psychological 
Association and the Texas Counseling Association were the primary opposition groups 
for the occupational licensing proposal for behavior analysts in Texas.  For both groups,
the prospect of licensing for behavior analysts creates a “turf war” of sorts.  Counselors 
and psychologists routinely deal with matters regarding the behavior of individuals, and 
both groups were concerned that occupational licensing would place some of their work 
under the exclusive practice of behavior analysts.  At that point, counselors and 
psychologists would either have to cease doing some of the work, which may be 
intertwined with their other work, or they would face the possibility of having to obtain a 
second license in order to continue practicing to the fullest extent of their training. Just 
as these concerns were stated by individual practitioners, firms that employ counselors 
and psychologists also had concerns because their flexibility in staffing would be limited.  
A behavioral health unit at a hospital, for instance, might have concerns as licensing for 
behavior analysts would prevent one employee, such as a counselor or psychologist, from 




doing everything needed to serve a patient.  If such facilities had to either hire licensed 
behavior analysts or contract with them in addition to their existing employees, it could 
have the effect of driving up the cost of services.
As a measure of political opposition to occupational licensing for behavior 
analysts, the number of individuals in the state that belonged to the American 
Psychological Association and the American Counseling Association in 2008 will be 
used. Just like with behavior analysts, data from each individual state organization would 
be the most helpful, but collecting information that is seven years old from 50 states (100 
total organizations) would not be feasible.  Therefore, the membership by state in the 
American Counseling Association plus the membership by state of the American 
Psychological Association will be used, as it should be highly correlated with 
membership in the state level associations for these two professions.  The political 
strength of these two groups in each state should be negatively correlated with 
occupational licensing for behavior analysts.  
State-Specific Characteristics
Some characteristics specific to each state may explain why some states require 
occupational licensing for behavior analysts and others do not. All data is from 2008, the 
year immediately before the first legislation affecting behavior analysts was passed.
1. Per capita income of each state:  The per-capita income of a state could 
affect is likeliness to require occupational licensing not just for behavior analysts, but for 
many other occupations as well.  As the literature commonly mentioned, low income 
individuals may be disproportionately harmed by occupational licensing as it reduces the 
supply of lower-cost service providers.  At the same time, one of the benefits stated by 




supporters of occupational licensing is the making of information available to the 
consumer.  If people use this information to select service providers, higher income 
individuals may benefit because they may have a higher opportunity cost of time in the 
total cost of searching for a service provider.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe 
that higher income levels are positively correlated with occupational licensing for 
behavior analysts.
2. Population:  Population is included in the model as a method of control 
since the numbers for membership in the Association of Professional Behavior Analysts 
are provided in raw numbers, without consideration for each state’s size.  It seems 
reasonable to believe that 100 behavior analysts in Texas would be less politically 
powerful than 100 behavior analysts in Wyoming.
3. Nature of population:  The percentage of each state’s population that lives 
in urban areas is another variable that may shine some light on the likelihood of licensing 
requirements in occupations.  One concern expressed in the literature and found to be a 
concern in the six case studies is that occupational licensing tends to limit the supply of 
service providers.  In urban areas, this may not be as concerning because the overall pool 
of service providers may still be large, even after some practitioners are screened out.  
For instance, Houston is the largest city in Texas and likely has a number of practicing 
behavior analysts.  Eliminating a few of those due to a licensing requirement would 
probably affect consumers much less than eliminating the only behavior analyst who 
practices in Borger, Texas, as Borger has a population of approximately 13,000 and any 
large city is several hours away.  Also, consumers in urban areas may be better able to 
find substitutes for behavior analysts.  If counselors or psychologists can do similar work, 




it seems reasonable to believe that large cities will have a number of these practitioners 
that could be substituted for behavior analysts.  However, small, rural towns are also not 
likely to have a large supply of practicing counselors or psychologists.  Therefore, the 
nature of the population (urban vs. rural) is important to this model.
4. Population density of states:  Each state is affected by occupational 
licensing requirements in neighboring states.  Small states may be affected the most 
because it is much easier to move or commute into the next state if occupational licensing 
laws change compared to larger states.  For example, practitioners in Delaware could 
easily, depending on their location in the state, commute to either Maryland or New 
Jersey to work if licensing requirements became burdensome in Delaware.  If such 
changes caused service provision to decline in Delaware, consumers could easily drive to 
neighboring states as well.  In contrast, a practitioner or consumer in Central Texas would 
be hundreds of miles from the nearest state in any direction.  Therefore, small states may 
have the most significant concerns about incompetent practitioners working within their 
borders to avoid occupational licensing requirements in other nearby states.  A variable 
for each state’s size in square miles is included in the model.
5. Ideology of states:  One potential explanation for whether or not an 
occupation is licensed from state to state is that populations of each state have different 
attitudes towards government regulation in general.  Overall, it is common knowledge 
that individuals who identify as “conservatives” do not favor high levels of government 
regulation, while individuals who identify as “liberals” tend to support higher levels of 
regulation.  In 2008, Gallup created an index of state ideology for the 50 states and 
Washington, D.C. by interviewing a random sample of adults who were 18 years of age 




or older throughout the year. The results of were reported by Gallup and listed each state 
with a percentage of “conservative” residents, a percentage of “liberal” residents, and a 
percentage of “moderate” residents.  This chapter will use the percentage of each state’s 
residents identifying as “conservative,” which ranges from 23 percent in Washington, 
D.C. to 49 percent in Alabama, and will proceed with the assumption that conservatism is 
negatively associated with occupational licensing for behavior analysts.
6. Political party identification by state:  Gallup has created an index
reflecting how each state’s residents identify in terms of political party affiliation.  It used 
the same survey group of adults who were 18 years of age or older during a time period 
of the year 2008.  Political affiliations were summarized by state as the percentage 
“Democratic/Leans Democratic” and the percentage “Republican/Leans Republican.”  
The “Democratic/Leans Democratic” measure ranges from 84.1 percent in Washington, 
D.C. to 32.4 percent in Utah. This study assumes that states with the highest percentage 
of self-proclaimed Democrats will be the most likely to have occupational licensing 
requirements for behavior analysts.  This is based on the fact that Democratic Party
platforms tend to support more government regulations, while Republican Party
platforms tend to oppose them.  Political party identification and self-identified ideology 
do not necessarily correlate for some individuals, which is why both variables are 
included in this study.
7. Paternalistic nature of state governments:  As discussed earlier in this 
work, occupational licensing contains at least some paternalistic aspects. States that tend 
to adopt policies that are designed to “help” people are more paternalistic in nature than 
those who don’t. This was discussed in noting that voluntary, or even private 




certification programs would serve the information-providing function that is often 
promoted by supporters of occupational licensing requirements.  While such a 
certification system would allow consumers to choose and pay for someone meeting 
certification requirements, occupational licensing does not allow this decision to be 
made.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe that the paternalistic nature of a state’s 
government will be positively associated with occupational licensing requirements for 
behavior analysts.  It is difficult to specifically measure paternalism in an empirical 
sense, but it is possible to use a proxy.  The proxy that will be used in this study will be 
whether or not a state has expanded Medicaid after the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act.  Expansions, passed in 31 states as of July 2015, are designed to help lower income 
families in accessing more medical care.  Other alternative means of health care provision 
for lower income nature are available, but since Medicaid expansion relies on 
government control, these states can be seen as being more paternalistic.
8. Overall number of licensed occupations by state:  Summers (2007) 
published a list of states, ranked by the number of licensed job categories.  This is not an 
exact measure of the number of licensing requirements, as some job categories could 
contain more than one occupational license.  Without thoroughly reading all state laws of 
each state related to occupational licensing, however, it is one of the better measures 
available in regards to the licensing activity of states.  At the time of the study, shortly 
before licensing requirements were first passed for behavior analysts, the average state 
required occupational licensing in 92 job categories. California had the highest level of 
occupational licensing, with requirements in 177 job categories, and Missouri had the 
lowest level of occupational licensing, with requirements in 41 job categories.  The 




number of occupations licensed by each state is expected to be positively correlated with 
occupational licensing requirements for behavior analysts.
9. Geographic region of states:  The model includes variables for regions of 
the country to test for two effects.  One is that many professional associations may 
operate on a regional level, as might other political forces supporting or opposing 
occupational licensing requirements.  It stands to reason that behavior analysts in New 
Hampshire and Vermont are more likely to share information and work together than 
practitioners in either state would share information with their counterparts in California.  
Also, as discussed earlier, states may enact occupational licensing requirements if 
neighboring states have done so and they do not want to face the possibility of 
incompetent practitioners crossing state lines to work in their state.  Also, state 
governments sometimes enter regional associations such as the Southern Legislative 
Conference, which might share public policy ideas with one another.  Variables used in 
this model correspond to the Census Bureau’s regional classification system of Northeast, 
Midwest, South, and West.
Aside from Hypothesis H2a, the following hypotheses also drive the work for this 
section of the chapter. 
H5o- There is no relationship between per-capita income of a state and licensing 
requirements for behavior analysts.
H5a- States with higher per-capita incomes are more likely to have occupational licensing 
requirements for behavior analysts.
H6o- There is no relationship between the population of a state and licensing 
requirements for behavior analysts.




H6a- States with larger populations are more likely to have occupational licensing 
requirements for behavior analysts.
H7o- There is no relationship between the nature of a state’s population and licensing 
requirements for behavior analysts.
H7a- States with a higher percentage of their populations residing in urban areas are more 
likely to have occupational licensing requirements for behavior analysts.
H8o- There is no relationship between a state’s population density and licensing 
requirements for behavior analysts.
H8a- The higher a state’s population density, the more likely the state is to require 
occupational licensing for behavior analysts.
H9o- There is no relationship between the ideology of a majority of state’s citizens and 
licensing requirements for behavior analysts.
H9a- The more a state’s population identifies with the liberal ideology, the more likely 
the state is to have occupational licensing requirements for behavior analysts.
H10o- There is no relationship between the most common political party affiliation in a 
state and licensing requirements for behavior analysts.
H10a- The more a state’s population identifies with the Democratic Party, the more likely 
the state is to have occupational licensing requirements for behavior analysts.
H11o- There is no relationship between the paternalistic nature of state governments and 
licensing requirements for behavior analysts.
H11a- States that take actions that could be described as paternalistic, such as expanding 
their Medicaid programs, are more likely to require occupational licensing for behavior 
analysts.




H12o- There is no relationship between the total number of occupations licensed by a 
state and licensing requirements for behavior analysts in that state.
H12a- The more total occupations that require licensing in a state, the more likely the 
state is to require occupational licensing for behavior analysts.
H13o- There is no relationship between the geographic region of a state and licensing 
requirements for behavior analysts.
H13a- States will be more likely to require occupational licensing for behvavior analysts 
if other states in their geographic region do so.
Table 9, found on the next page, summarizes the independent variables used for 
the empirical study on the occupation of behavior analysts, along with the sources of data 
and the expected impact of each independent variable. Table 9 also summarizes which 
hypothesis is connected with each expected impact.




Table 9 : Explanatory Variables, Expected Signs, and Data Sources
Variable Expected 
Sign






behavior analysts in 
the state (Yes/ No)
Data from Association of Professional 






Number of behavior 
analysts in the state 




+ H2a Association of Professional Behavior 
Analysts
Number of 
practitioners in the 
state who belong to 
the American 
Counseling 
Association plus the 
number of 
practitioners in the 




- H2a American Counseling Association, 
American Psychological Association
State Characteristics
Per capita income +/- H5a Statistical Abstract of the United 
States
Population +/- H6a Statistical Abstract of the United 
States
Percentage living in 
urban areas
+/- H7a Statistical Abstract of the United 
States
Population density - H8a Statistical Abstract of the United 
States





measured by passage 
of Medicaid 
expansion
+ H11a National Conference of State 
Legislatures
Number of licensed 
occupations
+ H12a Reason publication
Regional location +/- H13a United States Census Bureau






Part One: Results of Case Studies
In order to conduct the case studies, official legislative records were reviewed for 
the following occupational licensing proposals during the 2013 and 2015 sessions of the 
Texas Legislature: anesthesiology assistants, associate auctioneers, forensic anaylysts, 
foundation repair contractors, roofing contractors, and veterinary technicians.  The case 
studies included reviewing all video archives of committee hearings and House and 
Senate floor debates that were relevant to each of the six licensing proposals, along with 
official records describing the legislation and the registered supporters and opponents.  
The case studies show that the occupational licensing process in Texas, at least in these 
six instances, is not unlike the general economic theory of regulation.  In all six cases, the 
affected occupation and related industry groups were supporters of enacting licensing 
requirements, all claiming that licensing requirements would improve service quality or 
protect the interest of the public.  In the three of the six cases where licensing legislation 
failed, other organized interests opposed the legislation.  Among others, the Texas Nurses 
Association and the Texas Association of Nurse Anesthetists strongly opposed 
occupational licensing for anesthesiology assistants.  Most opposition to licensing for 
foundation repair contractors came from individual practitioners, as opposed to organized 
lobby groups, however, two influential Texas conservative think tanks, the Texas Public 
Policy Foundation and the Texas Conservative Coalition, both opposed the legislation.  




Many members of the Republican majority in the state legislature are closely associated 
with both groups.  Attempts to license roofing contractors have been ongoing through 
several legislative sessions, and legislation in 2013 moved further into the legislative 
process than other proposals.  Several trade associations representing small businesses 
and minority contractors opposed the legislation, as did the Texas Public Policy 
Foundation.  Texans for Fiscal Responsibility, a conservative non-profit group closely 
aligned with many legislators, also opposed the measure.  Only in one instance did a 
licensing measure support from a group representing consumers when the Coalition for 
Patient Safety registered in support of the bill to license anesthesiology assistants.  There 
was no testimony presented from individual consumers who had suffered any kind of 
harm from current practitioners in the occupations.  Through these six case studies, there 
was no evidence of the public interest theory of occupational licensing, as no consumers 
sought regulations to help them determine quality or to protect their interests.  There is 
also no evidence that legislators who authored and supported the legislation were 
working solely in the best interest of society in general, as they did not ever speak of 
cost-benefit analyses or question the overall effects of the licensing proposals.  Instead, 
certain individuals spoke of regulation being needed in their occupation.  Opponents
either mentioned increased costs or the increased scope of government without offering 
evidence to support their claims, and the outcome was largely determined by the size and 
political influence of the groups involved.
Despite the lack of clear information being presented on the costs and benefits of 
licensing, this alone does not suggest that the decision to require occupational licensing is 
a bad public policy decision.  Also, it is not clear whether the licensing proposals would 




have even been present on the legislative agenda, let alone had any chance of passing, if 
influential industry groups had not been supportive.  In the six case studies, it seemed that 
influential groups were supporting all six licensing proposals.  However, in the three that 
failed, other influential groups opposed the proposals.  For the three that passed, there 
was less controversy and less organized opposition.
Out of the six case studies, four of the occupations represented could pose harm 
beyond the individual practitioner and the person requesting the services.  Poor quality 
work done by foundation repair contractors or roofing contractors could later have 
negative effects for future owners of the properties where the work was performed.  This 
argument was rarely made in testimony on the legislation, and no statistical evidence to 
show whether licensing requirements would alleviate such concerns was introduced.  
Poor quality work by forensic analysts could conceivably cause problems in having a fair 
trial, and although this was discussed, nothing was ever stated to directly link 
incompetent forensic analysts with wrongful convictions. Poor quality work by 
anesthesiology assistants could potentially cause harm to patients, but no examples of this 
were offered.  In fact, it was said by some supporters of occupational licensing that they 
thought safety in operating rooms throughout Texas was very high.
On the next page, Table 10 provides a summary of the findings from each case 
study.  Table 10 lists the organizations that officially registered their support or 
opposition to each item of legislation along with the outcome of the last vote that was 
taken on the issue.  Finally, Table 10 lists the total amount of states with licensing 
requirements for each of the six occupations.




Table 10: Summary of Texas Occupational Licensing Case Studies






Texas Society of Anesthesiologists
Texas Academy of Anesthesiology 
Assistants
Children’s Medical Center








Failed by a House vote 
of 61-67.  A motion to 





Texas Public Policy Foundation
Texas Wholesale Automobile 
Auction Association
Texas Association of Realtors.
Texas Auctioneers Association
Passed by a House vote 





Texas Association of Crime Lab 
Directors
Innocence Project of Texas
Passed by a House vote 






Homeowners for Better Building
Foundation Repair Association
Texas Mortgage Bankers 
Association
Texas Association of Realtors




Failed by a House vote 
of 62-73.






North Texas Roofing Contractors 
Association
Insurance Claim Recovery Support
Texas Association of Realtors
Professional Roofing Standards 
Council
Roofing Contractors Association 
of Texas
Texas Association of Business
Building Officials Association of 
Texas
Independent Insurance Agents of 
Texas
National Association of Mutual 
Insurance Companies













Texans for Fiscal 
Responsibility
Passed House Licensing 
Committee on 
Administrative 
Procedures by vote of 6-
1.  Failed when it was 





Texas Veterinary Medical 
Association
Texas Association of Registered 
Veterinary Technicians
Texas Farm Bureau
Texas Association of Dairymen
Texas Cattle Feeders Association
Texas Poultry Federation
Texans for Fiscal 
Responsibility
Passed by Senate vote 




In three recent sessions of the Texas legislature, legislation has been filed that 
would require an occupational license to practice as an anesthesiology assistant.  In the 




2007 and 2009 sessions, two bills were filed each time.  In both instances, one of the two 
bills received a committee hearing and did not move further in the process while the 
second bill was not heard.  In 2015, the idea was once again before the Texas House of 
Representatives in the form of House Bill 2267.  This bill advanced from the House 
Committee on Public Health to a floor vote.  Supporters of the legislation stated that 
occupational licensing would protect the public from bad actors who might work as 
anesthesiology assistants, that it would lead to higher levels of patient safety in operating 
rooms, and that it would bring about better accountability and transparency in the 
healthcare system.  A bill analysis provided by the legislative office of the author, 
Representative Sarah Davis, noted that the bill’s purpose was “to provide access to safe 
anesthesia care while maintaining the role of an anesthesiologist assistant on a patient’s 
care team.”  The Texas Medical Association, known to be a powerful force in healthcare 
policy in Texas, was supportive of the legislation.  Other supportive groups included 
organizations for anesthesiology assistants and educational programs for anesthesiology 
assistants, as well as the Coalition for Patient Safety.  Opponents included some smaller 
healthcare associations, such as those for nurses, nurse practitioners, and nurse 
anesthetists.  In the end, the nursing associations became the lobbying force for most of 
the opposition, and the bill failed.
This latest attempt to license anesthesiology assistants was, to some extent, a 
competition between organized political interests.  The debate over the legislation 
included virtually no evidence that occupational licensing would be helpful in this case, 
while slight evidence was presented that it was unnecessary.  Despite the power of the 
Texas Medical Association, it seems likely that the bill was defeated due to the fact that 




opposing interests organized and lobbied more strongly than those in favor.  With nursing 
groups opposed to the bill, it is likely that most legislators had multiple nurses in their
districts who were members of one or more of these associations and were opposed to the 
bill.  The lack of debate about the effects of the legislation on the occupation, costs, and 
quality of services was very noticeable.  
House Bill 2267 called for licensing of anesthesiology assistants and would have 
largely left licensing application requirements and continuing education requirements to 
the Texas Medical Board, to be adopted through administrative rules.  Key components 
of the bill included:
The Texas Medical Board would establish requirements to obtain an 
anesthesiology assistant license, including education and training 
requirements, in addition to basic requirements outlined in the legislation 
including proof of completion of a graduate level training program, the 
passage of a certifying exam, and being of good moral character.
The Texas Medical Board would establish examination requirements for 
an anesthesiology assistant.
The legislation required the Texas Medical Board to adopt rules on 
requirements and limitations of services by an anesthesiology assistant, 
determined by the board to be in the best interests of patient health and 
safety.
The legislation included a requirement that an anesthesiology assistant 
would be supervised by a licensed anesthesiologist who was actively 
engaged in clinical practice and available on-site.
The use of the title “anesthesiologist assistant” would have become 
restricted to license holders only, with violators subject to an 
administrative penalty.
Students in anesthesiology assistant training programs would be restricted 
from using terminology that could be construed to mean they held a 
license.
Unlicensed practice or any other violations of licensing provisions would 
have subjected the violator to an administrative penalty (Texas Legislature 
2015).




Representative Davis, a Republican who authored the legislation, has previously 
been active in healthcare policy and is a member of the House Committee on Public 
Health.  Davis represents portions of Harris County, the largest county in the state, which 
is home to many medical professionals as well as one of the graduate level 
anesthesiology assistant training programs.  The measure had no joint authors or 
coauthors.  
The most outspoken opposition to the licensing of anesthesiology assistants came 
from the Texas Association of Nurse Anesthetists.  That association is supportive of the 
current structure where anesthesiologists delegate responsibility and, by doing so, are 
responsible for the services of an anesthesiology assistant.  Juan Quintana, representing 
the association, stated in a public hearing that “licensing won’t change how they work,” 
and described the bill as “a solution looking for a problem.”  Gary Brydges testified that 
in the case of bad actors, there were national databases known as the Focused Provider 
Practice Evaluation (FPPE) and the Ongoing Provider Practice Evaluation (OPPE) that 
could be used to record problems with any healthcare professional and could be used by 
future potential employers to protect against bad actors.  Therefore, Brydges concluded, 
occupational licensing would provide no information to help patient safety that could not 
already be provided.  At the conclusion of the hearing, Representative Davis noted that 
she was not aware of any complaints or allegations of malpractice against anesthesiology 
assistants in Texas.  Various other points were made against an occupational licensing 
requirement:
Job opportunities, educational opportunities, and an understanding of the 
expectations that come with the job are available and well utilized without 
a licensing system.




Anesthesiologists and anesthesiology assistants are the only two groups 
that would stand to benefit from a licensing requirement.
Adding a licensing requirement expands government and adds more 
bureaucracy in a way that could be burdensome to employers. (Texas 
House Committee on Public Health: April 7, 2015 Public Hearing 2015).
The bill was voted favorably out of the Committee on Public Health, with only 
one committee member opposed.  The bill then advanced through the House Committee 
on Calendars, which schedules legislation for a floor vote.  By the time that the bill 
moved towards the House floor, the groups against the legislation included the Texas 
Association of Nurse Anesthetists, the Texas Nurses Association, the Texas Nurse 
Practitioners Association, and the Nursing Legislative Agenda Coalition (Texas 
Legislature 2015). Opponents in the House included members who typically oppose new 
regulations, including occupational licensing and were joined by other members who 
were not usually as outspoken on regulatory issues.  
Representative Davis provided very little evidence to support her case that the 
licensing bill would be beneficial to public safety.  In fact, her case might have been 
harmed by her admission in the public hearing that she was not aware of any problems 
with the work of unlicensed anesthesiology assistants.  The opposing side was able to 
substantiate a few of their points.  For instance, they pointed to specific industry 
databases where bad actors could be tracked in the healthcare field, supporting their 
argument that there was already a way to make sure only the best people in the field were 
provided with employment opportunities.  No legislator ever publicly asked for even an 
estimate of the costs compared to the benefits of such legislation.  Supporters of the bill 
mentioned other states where licensure is required, but no one even attempted to show 
that those states had better quality work from anesthesiology assistants than those in 




Texas.  No legislators publicly asked about comparisons to other states.   While the bill 
was being debated on the House floor, two legislators, one supporter of the bill and one 
opponent, asked Representative Davis some specific questions about the intent of the bill 
and the type of work that anesthesiology assistants were doing when the bill came to a 
vote on the House floor.  During this debate, Representative Davis deferred to 
Representative John Zerwas, who is an anesthesiologist, to stand with her and answer the 
questions that were posed.  Again, Representative Zerwas may not have helped his case 
when he was asked if the licensing proposal would make operating rooms safer.  “There 
is a high level of safety that already exists…,” Zerwas responded, “but if we can enhance 
public safety, we should do it.”  Ultimately, the bill failed by a vote of 61 in favor and 67 
against (Texas House of Representatives: May 1, 2015 Floor Session 2015). On the next 
legislative day, a motion was made to reconsider the vote.  Upon reconsideration, the bill 
failed by a vote of 62 in favor and 75 against, showing that most legislators who were 
absent during the first vote were opponents of the bill (Texas House of Representatives: 
May 2, 2015 Floor Session 2015).
Anesthesiology assistants are currently licensed in 15 states.  Some of the other 
states do not allow this type of work to be done at all by someone other than a physician, 
and other states such as Texas allow it under supervision without a license.  It is unknown 
why anesthesiology assistants have become licensed in some states and not others, but the 
arguments about the need to improve patient safety may be compelling in many states, 
regardless of whether anyone actually checks to see if there is a problem.  Since this type 
of licensing has been promoted since 2007, it would not be unlikely for the legislation to 
return in a future legislative session.





Auctioneers in Texas have had licensing requirements since the 1999 legislative 
session.  In the 2015 session, two bills were introduced to establish licensing for associate 
auctioneers.  One of those, House Bill 2481, was passed and signed into law by the 
governor.  HB 2481 was authored by Representative Wayne Smith, the chairman of the 
House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures.  The licensing 
requirement was virtually uncontested.  The Texas Auctioneer’s Association opposed the 
bill but upon listening to their representative, Brent Graves, testify in a public hearing in 
the House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures, he was concerned 
about a separate provision of the bill dealing with motor vehicle auctions and did not 
mention the licensing of associate auctioneers at all in his testimony.  Two other 
individuals testified against the bill, but also did not mention the associate auctioneer 
licensing at all (Texas House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures: 
March 30, 2015 Public Hearing 2015). In fact, in a hearing on House Bill 2494, which 
also would have imposed a license on associate auctioneers without changing regulations 
for motor vehicle auctions, another representative from the Texas Auctioneers 
Association testified in support of the bill (Texas House Committee on Licensing and 
Administrative Procedures: April 6, 2015 Public Hearing 2015). The bill ultimately 
passed the House by a vote of 134-9 and passed the Senate by a vote of 30-1.
The bill defined an associate auctioneer to be an individual who, for 
compensation, is employed by and under the direct supervision of a licensed auctioneer to 
sell or offer to sell property at an auction.  An individual is eligible for an associate 
auctioneer license if he or she is a citizen or legal resident of the United States and 




employed under the direct supervision of an auctioneer.  Prior to the passage of House 
Bill 2481, only four other states had licensing requirements for assistant or associate 
auctioneers.  Texas auctioneers were able to hire non-auctioneer employees to work for 
them or their auction companies as long as non-licensed employees did not use the title of 
“auctioneer” or act as an auctioneer.  Another provision in the legislation lets associate 
auctioneers become eligible for an auctioneer license in lieu of passing an exam if they 
show proof of employment as an associate auctioneer by a licensed auctioneer for at least 
two years and participation in at least 10 auctions.  Therefore, becoming a licensed 
associate auctioneer will allow an auctioneer licensing applicant to be exempt from the 
exam, but it will not waive any requirements pertaining to their education level, their 
criminal record, or 80 hours of required classroom instruction (Texas Legislature 2015).
Greg Glod of the Texas Public Policy Foundation, an influential conservative think-tank, 
testified in support of the legislation as he stated that the Texas auctioneer exam only had 
about a 75 percent pass rate, which created a barrier to entry in the occupation which he 
called “overregulated.”  He stated his belief that this would allow capable employees who 
had completed the training requirement an alternative way to enter the profession.  No 
members of the Licensing and Administrative Procedures Committee questioned Glod’s 
statistics, nor was there any discussion by Glod or others as to whether it would be 
workable to allow a person to show proof of employment for two years and participation 
in 10 auctions without creating a new occupational license.  This represented the only 
discussion of the merits of an associate auctioneer license in the public hearing.  
Representative Charlie Geren, a member of the Licensing committee, noted that most 
licensing requirements and other regulations of auctioneers had been placed into law at 




the request of the industry (Texas House Committee on Licensing and Administrative 
Procedures: March 30, 2015 Public Hearing 2015).
After House Bill 2481 passed unanimously out of the House Committee on 
Licensing and Administrative Procedures and was scheduled for a floor vote, 
Representative Smith introduced his bill on the floor as an “auctioneer clean-up bill.”  He 
briefly discussed some features of the bill, but did not mention the provision on associate 
auctioneers at all and no other representatives asked questions or spoke for or against the 
bill.  It passed with only nine representatives opposed (Texas House of Representatives: 
April 20, 2015 Floor Session 2015). In the Senate, the bill was introduced in a hearing of 
the Senate Business and Commerce committee with Committee Chair and Senate author 
Kevin Eltife saying that the bill corrected some issues that have impacted the auction 
industry, and that the associate auctioneer provision was to allow auction experience in 
lieu of an examination to satisfy auctioneer licensing requirements.  Again, no one asked 
Senator Eltife if this was possible without creating a new license (Texas Senate 
Committee on Business and Commerce: April 14, 2015 Public Hearing 2015). On the 
Senate floor, Eltife introduced the bill without mentioning the associate auctioneer 
provision, and there was no discussion at all from other senators.  The bill passed with 
only one senator opposed (Texas Senate: May 22, 2015 Floor Session 2015).
Associate auctioneers, also known sometimes as apprentice auctioneers or 
assistant auctioneers, are currently licensed in six states.  Other states with auctioneer 
regulations allow auctioneers to employ non-licensed individuals as long as those 
individuals are not conducting auctions.  In 20 states, there are no licensing requirements 
for any auction employees, including auctioneers.  In one additional state, there is only a 




voluntary registration program operated by the state.  With so many states not regulating 
auctioneers at all, it is unknown what prompted Texas and five other states to begin the 
regulation of associate auctioneers.  As Representative Geren noted in the House 
committee hearing, the auction industry was supportive of the bill, as well as other 
licensing requirements implemented in their industry in the past, and the lack of 
influential groups opposing the licensing requirement seemed to translate into a lack of 
opposition among legislators.
Forensic Analysts
In the 2015 legislative session, Senate Bill 1287 was proposed to require licensing 
of forensic analysts.  As opposed to law enforcement officers who work crime scenes, 
who are already regulated, the bill was designed to apply to crime lab employees, both in 
the private and public sectors.  A licensing proposal for this occupation had never been 
introduced in Texas prior to 2015. As with the case of associate auctioneers, it seems that 
the most likely reason that Senate Bill 1287 passed, although narrowly, is due to the lack 
of organized opposition.  At no point did any member of the legislature ask which other 
states require licensing for forensic analysts and whether or not such requirements helped 
with the issue of wrongful convictions.  At no time did any member of the legislature ask 
any questions regarding the costs and benefits of the legislation.  The only group in favor 
of the bill actually representing the general public did not offer any examples of how the 
bill would actually be helpful to the public.  No explanations were offered by the bill 
sponsors, and no other questions were asked.  
The first public discussion on the bill took place on April 7, 2015 when the bill 
was considered in a public hearing before the Senate Committee on Criminal Justice.  In 




the hearing, Senator Juan Hinojosa, the bill sponsor, introduced the bill by saying that the 
forensic analyst industry currently depended on private certification, something he did 
not see as consistent.  He stated his belief that the state had no legal mechanism to 
prevent bad actors from moving to other crime laboratories after being fired or asked to 
resign at previous places of employment.  Senate Bill 1287 established an advisory 
committee, which was designed to establish qualifications for licenses required by the 
bill.  Hinojosa stated his belief that Texas was taking a step in solving a national problem 
that would serve as a model to other states.  In his presentation of the bill, Hinojosa also 
said that many people have wrongly convicted people of crimes and that doing away with 
“junk science” would be a step towards solving the problem with wrongful convictions.  
Although Hinojosa did not directly blame wrongful convictions on poor quality work 
done by forensic analysts, such was the implication of his comments (Texas Senate 
Committee on Criminal Justice: April 7, 2015 Public Hearing 2015).
At the Senate committee hearing, five people registered in favor of Senate Bill 
1287.  Three were associated with crime laboratories, one represented a large county 
government agency, and one represented an advocacy group known as the Innocence 
Project of Texas.  Bill Gibbons, president of the Crime Lab Association of Texas, 
addressed the committee in support of the bill stating that the bill was derived from a 
position paper that his organization had published about a year beforehand.  He stated his 
belief that a licensing requirement would be beneficial in holding forensic analysts 
accountable for their actions.  Linda Johnson, director of a regional crime laboratory in 
Beaumont, Texas echoed comments made by Gibbons and said that she believed some 
type of licensure or certification requirements for all forensic practitioners was inevitable.  




Nick Vilbas spoke in favor of the bill on behalf of the Innocence Project of Texas, stating 
that he wanted to see the best science being put forth in Texas courtrooms.  Despite the 
fact that the association represented by Vilbas represents individuals who feel they have 
been wrongfully accused and convicted, Vilbas did not offer any comments as to whether 
the licensure of forensic analysts would help improve the issue of wrongful convictions.  
No senators on the committee questioned Vilbas about this issue (Texas Senate 
Committee on Criminal Justice: April 7, 2015 Public Hearing 2015).
On April 16, 2015, Senate Bill 1287 came to a vote before the full Senate.  
Hinojosa briefly explained that he was sponsoring the bill to require licensing for 
individuals who were “highly trained to do important work in forensic testing.”  He also 
again pointed out that “bad science can lead to a wrongful conviction,” but once again 
failed to point to any specific instances of this happening.  There was very little 
discussion on the legislation aside from questions that were asked which had nothing to 
do with the creation of an occupational licensing requirement.  The bill passed the Senate 
by a vote of 29-2 (Texas Senate: April 16, 2015 Floor Session 2015).
No additional public discussion took place concerning Senate Bill 1287 until the 
final few weeks of the 2015 legislative session when the bill was heard in a public 
hearing of the House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures.  
Representative Charlie Geren, House sponsor, took less than one minute to describe the 
bill’s purpose in his layout.  Two members of the public, one representing crime 
laboratories and another representing a large county government agency registered in 
favor of the bill and no one registered against.  Bill Gibbons, president of the Crime Lab 
Association of Texas, addressed the committee in support of the bill much as he had done 




with the Senate committee.  He again stated that his organization had recommended 
licensing requirements and that the bill developed due to work published by his 
organization.  No committee members asked any questions regarding the bill, and it was 
unanimously voted out of committee (Texas House Committee on Licensing and 
Administrative Procedures: May 18, 2015 Public Hearing 2015).
On May 25, 2015, the bill was before the full House for consideration.  Just as he 
had done in committee, Geren took less than one minute to explain the bill and it was 
passed on second reading by a vote of 83-53.  No legislators asked any questions of 
Geren, nor did anyone speak in favor of the bill or in opposition (Texas House of 
Representatives: May 25, 2015 Floor Session 2015). The next day, the bill was 
considered on third reading, or final passage, and it passed by a vote of 74-72, showing 
that a number of representatives had changed their minds from the previous day.  
Whether it was due to more closely studying the legislation or whether there was a last 
minute lobbying effort against the bill is unknown as, once again, no one asked any 
questions about the bill and no one spoke in opposition to the bill or in support.  At the 
end of the day, three representatives recorded statements in the House Journal stating that 
they were shown voting in favor of Senate Bill 1287, but had intended to vote against it.  
Had they voted accordingly on the floor, the bill would have failed by a vote of 75-71
(Texas House of Representatives: May 26, 2015 Floor Session 2015). Based on this 
detail, at least one representative who was opposed to the bill contacted the office of 
Governor Greg Abbott and asked that the bill be vetoed.  However, Abbott signed the bill 
into law on June 20, 2015.  In addition to Texas, only two other states require licensing 
for forensic analysts.





In three recent sessions of the Texas legislature, a total of five bills have been 
filed which ultimately would have required occupational licensing for foundation repair 
contractors.  The first attempt came in 2009 with House Bill 3629, which had the original 
purpose of requiring licensing for builders.  As it moved through the process, it was 
amended to include foundation repair contractors and several other occupations.  The bill 
stalled after a committee hearing, never reaching a vote.  In 2011, Senate Bill 1399 and 
House Bill 2530 were both filed to address the licensing of foundation repair contractors.  
Both bills stalled after committee hearings without receiving a vote.  In 2013, House Bill 
613 and Senate Bill 802 were filed with the same purpose.  In this year, supporters of 
licensing for foundation repair contractors made the most progress by getting House Bill 
613 to a vote.  Ultimately, it was voted down by a House vote of 62-73.  No attempt was 
made during the 2015 legislative session to file legislation to license foundation repair 
contractors.
This latest attempt to license foundation repair contractors was, to some extent, a 
competition between organized political interests.  While the larger groups that supported 
licensure might have had more power in terms of membership size, it is clear that the 
smaller companies and individual workers who opposed the legislation were effective in 
getting their message across to legislators who were willing to oppose the bill.  The 
debate over the legislation included virtually no evidence that occupational licensing 
would be helpful in this case.  Any stated reasons for supporting the bill were largely 
hypothetical.  Some opponents of the bill raised concerns about barriers to entry, costs, 
availability of services if the bill passed, and similar licensing requirements in other 




states.  Supporters of the bill did not directly address those issues.  The failure of 
supporters to produce any kind of data supporting their case was very noticeable.  
In 2013, House Bill 613, known as the Foundation Repair Contractors’ Act, 
would have established a new advisory board as a part of the Texas Department of 
Licensing and Regulation (TDLR).  The bill defined the terms “foundation,”  “foundation 
repair company,” “foundation repair contracting,” “foundation repair work,” as well as 
other terms related to the occupation.  A background and purpose statement issued by 
State Representative Rob Orr, the bill author, said that “unqualified and unscrupulous 
people…perform foundation repairs, often with disastrous results for people’s homes.”  
House Bill 613 would have established several levels of licensure for foundation repair 
contractors including foundation repair company, master, journeyman, and estimator.  
The 22 page bill established eligibility requirements for each level of licensure.  Under 
the bill, an applicant for any level of license would have had to consent to a criminal 
history background check, pay fees, meet certain levels of education and work experience 
requirements, pass examinations required by TDLR, and obtain specific amounts of 
liability insurance coverage.  Licenses issued under the legislation would have been good 
for one year, then foundation repair practitioners would have had to renew the license by 
paying another fee and showing that they completed continuing education requirements.  
The bill defined types of work that would be illegal to perform without a foundation 
repair license, and made any violation subject to both administrative penalties levied by 
TDLR and criminal penalties.  Criminal penalties would have been used in the event 
someone violated licensing requirements or employed individuals to do foundation repair 
work who were not licensed.  Upon criminal conviction, a fine of up to $500 per offense 




could have been levied.  The bill did not apply to foundation work performed as part of 
new construction, but only to work performed during repairs (Texas Legislature 2013).
House Bill 613 was first discussed in public during a March 26, 2013 hearing of 
the House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures.  Prior to the lengthy 
hearing, 11 people registered their support for the bill, and six people registered their 
opposition.  Supporters included representatives of large interest groups dealing with 
foundation repair, home loans, and realtors.  Opponents included representatives of small 
construction companies and small foundation repair companies as well as two influential 
conservative think tanks in Texas (Texas House Committee on Licensing and 
Administrative Procedures: March 26, 2013 Public Hearing 2013).
Representative Orr opened the hearing by noting his desire to clean up the 
foundation repair industry and protect Texas homeowners.  Though Orr said he generally 
supported less regulation, he explained that he was “personally seeing devastation that 
bad foundation repairs cause.”  He indicated that plumbers and electricians were required 
to be licensed in the state, and he thought foundations were just as important as plumbing 
and electricity, if not more important.  Although Orr did not describe examples of 
specific individuals who were harmed by the industry, he cautioned that if people owed 
money on a home loan, then had to spend additional money for foundation repair work 
that turned out to be poor quality, their only option might be to let the home go into 
foreclosure.  According to Orr, the bill contained a grandfather clause for anyone already 
in the foundation repair business, and those individuals would have been able to obtain a 
license without meeting any of the requirements (Texas House Committee on Licensing 
and Administrative Procedures: March 26, 2013 Public Hearing 2013).




Jim Dutton, of the Foundation Repair Association, spoke in favor of the bill.  
Dutton said that his industry had changed over the years, and that now many companies 
do as much as $30 million worth of work in a single year.  He stated that licensing was 
necessary to have some strength in the rules because, “right now, the only recourse a 
homeowner has is to go back and sue that contractor,” noting that many people in this 
situation might not be able to afford an attorney.  Dutton also hosts a statewide home 
improvement radio show and stated that when he brought up the issue of House Bill 613 
on his show, many people called in to support the licensing requirements with only two 
people calling in opposition.  Paul Wolf, also of the Foundation Repair Association, 
echoed Dutton’s comments and said that he saw the bill as an attempt to raise the bar and 
the standards in his industry.  Janet Ahmad, representing Homeowners for Better 
Building, described the occupation of foundation repair as an industry that “has gotten 
out of hand,” because some people will try to fix anything and prey on consumers.  
Ahmad stated that the bill should go further and regulate homebuilders as well (Texas 
House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures: March 26, 2013 Public 
Hearing 2013).
Opponents to House Bill 613 were very vocal in their testimony.  Susan Bryan, 
representing SA Structural Repair Solutions, noted that less than 500 companies made up 
the foundation repair industry in Texas.  According to Bryan, House Bill 613 would have 
been a “big piece of regulation” for what is a very small industry.  Bryan stated that she 
had 15 years of experience in the construction industry and saw occupational licensing 
requirements as burdensome red tape for small businesses and as something that drove 
costs up for the consumer and limited competition, which does nothing to help 




consumers.  Mike DeShazer, of Brown Foundation Repair, spoke against the bill and 
noted that what might appear to be shoddy work performed by foundation repair 
contractors could be due to poor quality foundations to begin with.  DeShazer noted that 
his industry already faced regulatory scrutiny, as he was registered with the state and also 
had to follow a multitude of municipal regulations imposed by some cities in which he 
worked which included insurance requirements and permitting.  Like Bryan, DeShazer 
stated that licensing would likely raise the cost of foundation repair for Texans or 
possibly put it out of reach.  DeShazer noted his belief in free enterprise, saying that 
competition has improved his industry and made it better, but he doubted that licensing 
would have the same effect.  Daniel Jaggers, a self-employed contractor with over 40 
years of experience in the industry, also testified against the bill saying that most 
foundation repair companies began as small start-up operations and that regulations 
would be burdensome for such companies.  Jaggers also stated that industry training and 
certifications were already available, which were likely to be more beneficial than a 
license issued by the state.  Mike Archer, of CL Support Services, spoke against the bill 
and noted that his organization operated 18 companies in 16 states and that none of his 
foundation repair work was regulated aside from in two states where it was regulated 
under general contracting.  Archer believed the bill was not about consumer safety issues, 
as he stated that plenty of information was already available about contractors and their 
reputations.  He stated that a license doesn’t equal quality and that in his business, he 
worried more about getting sued by a customer than he would worry about a fine from
licensing violations.  Vikrant Reddy, of the Texas Public Policy Foundation, spoke 
against the bill and offered comments on occupational licensing in general, saying that 




small businesses would be likely to suffer while large companies would benefit.  Reddy 
stated that there was inadequate evidence that licensing would improve quality, and he 
believed that the state’s tort system handled any problems more than adequately (Texas 
House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures: March 26, 2013 Public 
Hearing 2013).
House Bill 613 first came up for debate before the full House on May 6, 2013.  
Orr introduced the bill by noting that in general, he believed that regulations should be 
less and described himself as a “free market guy.”  However, he indicated that because of 
the nature of the work, foundation repair was different from other industries that could be 
facing regulation.  He mentioned that his bill was supported by large industry groups 
including the Foundation Repair Association, Texas Realtors Association, and the Texas 
Mortgage Bankers Association.  Orr was questioned by State Representative Bill 
Callegari, a longtime vocal critic of occupational licensing policies.  Callegari noted that 
licensing was not required for most of the construction industry in Texas and that he 
believed that requiring licensure for foundation repair contractors would “open the door 
to license a lot of things that don’t need to be licensed.”  Callegari also explained his 
belief that while a licensing requirement would enact burdens for honest foundation 
repair contractors, the bad actors would not be burdened as they don’t feel bound by legal 
requirements and would continue operating by breaking the law.  Callegari also stated 
that in small communities, contractors who work for themselves or in very small business 
might not do enough business to make licensure worthwhile, which would take away 
important services from these communities.  Callegari closed by saying that for 12 years, 
he had been working to eliminate licensing barriers and that occupational licensing 




requirements in Texas already affected over 500 occupations as well as one-third of all 
workers in the state.  Callegari stated that in his extensive study of the state’s licensing 
requirements, he found that they tended to keep potential workers out of industries, but 
didn’t actually work at achieving the stated objectives (Texas House of Representatives: 
May 6, 2013 Floor Session 2013).
Also speaking against the bill were State Representatives Steve Toth and Matt 
Schaefer.  According to Toth, four years prior, before he was a legislator, licensing 
requirements had been enacted for his industry.  Combined with an economic downturn 
in the state around 2009, Toth said coming into compliance with the new regulations 
nearly put him out of business and that, similarly, the proposed licensing requirement for 
foundation repair contractors “puts an incredible burden on small businesspeople.”  
Schaefer criticized the lack of consistency with the legislation.  It “won’t require the very 
people who build the foundation” to be licensed, he stated, saying that such an exemption 
did not make sense and was inconsistent with the stated goals of protecting consumers 
from bad actors who may work on foundations.  Despite Orr’s assertion that major 
stakeholders supported the bill, Schaefer pointed to the opposition of smaller contractors 
saying, “this bill did not have unanimous consent in the industry.”  Furthermore, Schaefer 
noted that “handymen” might perform some of the minor repairs specified in the 
legislation without considering themselves foundation repair contractors and that he did 
not see a need to make these repairs performed by handymen a “criminal act.”   He said 
that many workers who would potentially be affected might not even know the legislation 
was being considered until it passed and they found themselves accused of committing a 
crime just for working in their occupation.  Schaefer also noted that requiring the passage 




of a criminal background check prior to obtaining a license might negatively affect 
people who had a conviction related to drugs or some other non-violent offense but had 
since stayed out of trouble and wanted a chance to work and support themselves.  “We 
continue to add layer upon layer of regulation to our economy,” Schaefer said in closing.  
“This bill is bad for low income people” (Texas House of Representatives: May 6, 2013 
Floor Session 2013).
After the strong opposition mounted by Callegari, Toth, and Schaefer, Orr 
decided to postpone consideration of the bill and work on some changes.  Three days 
later, House Bill 613 was again before the House for consideration.  The bill, once 22 
pages, had been cut to seven pages and a voluntary registration program.  To be 
voluntarily registered, a foundation repair contractor would have needed five years of 
experience, the passage of a criminal background check, to pay the registration fees, to 
pass an examination, and to keep the registration active would have been required to meet 
continuing education requirements.  The revised bill language would not have penalized 
anyone for working in the industry without a registration.  Orr stated that the revised bill 
would allow people to be distinguished from their competition without harming other 
practitioners in the industry.  State Representatives Roland Gutierrez, Larry Gonzales, 
Poncho Nevarez, and Jason Villalba all expressed their support for the revised version of 
the bill, with Gutierrez noting that the barriers to entry, which had concerned some 
people in the original bill, were now gone.  However, Callegari and Schaefer still 
opposed the bill, adding to their concerns expressed days earlier.  Schaefer stated his 
belief that while it would be perfectly legal for foundation repair contractors to work 
without participating in a voluntary registration program, consumers might not 




understand that it was voluntary and that individuals who choose not to participate would 
be at a disadvantage.  Since some municipalities already regulate construction, Schaefer 
said, the regulation would be duplicative and the state might been seen as making lists of 
good businesses and bad businesses.  Schaefer said that just because there was risk to the 
consumer did not mean that licensure was necessary, as he mentioned automobile 
mechanics who are not licensed in Texas, but who are trusted to keep cars traveling at 
fast speeds safe on the roadways.  Finally, Schaefer said he believed supporters of the 
original bill would not stop at enacting a voluntary registration if it was passed.  “I do 
believe this is going to lead to full blown licensure,” he said.  “This is not good economic 
freedom.”  Callegari agreed with Schaefer, saying that he had seen voluntary registration 
programs in the past that quickly became mandatory, and said then it would add to the 
proliferation of licenses.  He said that trade associations could and did perform 
registration functions without the state’s involvement (Texas House of Representatives: 
May 9, 2013 Floor Session 2013).
Foundation repair contractors are currently licensed in three states, two of which 
regulate them only under statutes regulating general construction.  It is unknown why 
foundation repair contractors have become licensed in such few states and not others, but 
the arguments about the need to protect property owners may be compelling in many 
states, regardless of whether anyone actually checks to see if there is a problem.  Since 
this type of licensing has been promoted since 2009, it would not be unlikely for the 
legislation to return in a future legislative session.





Legislation with the aim of requiring occupational licensing for roofing 
contractors has been filed in every biennial legislative session in Texas since 1997, with 
the exception of the 2007 session. Table 11, shown below, summarizes the outcome of 
each legislative attempt during that time period to require occupational licensing for 
roofing contractors.  In both 1997 and 2003, the legislation passed the Senate, but not the 
House.  No other attempts have advanced as far as a floor vote in either chamber.
Table 11: History of Occupational Licensing Legislation for Roofing Contractors in 
Texas
Year Legislation Outcome
1997 Senate Bill 259 Passed the Senate, defeated on a 
procedural technicality in the 
House.
1999 House Bill 2044 No action taken.
2001 House Bill 2849 No action taken.
2003 Senate Bill 1176 Passed the Senate, no action taken 
in the House.
2005 House Bill 3304 Considered at a public hearing in 
the House, no action taken.
2009 House Bill 1854 Considered at a public hearing in 
the House, no action taken.
2011 Senate Bill 1274 Considered at a public hearing in 
the Senate, no action taken.
2013 Senate Bill 311 Considered at a public hearing in 
the Senate, no action taken.
2013 House Bill 888 No action taken.
2013 House Bill 2693 Voted out of House committee by 
6-1 vote.  No action taken in 
Calendars committee.
2015 House Bill 1488 No action taken.
2015 House Bill 2734 Considered at a public hearing in 
the House, no action taken.
Each attempt at licensing roofing contractors has ultimately failed.  In 1997, the 
proposal passed the Senate and was considered in the House until it was defeated on a 
procedural move.  The bills have been sponsored by a variety of Republican legislators 
over the past 18 years, and in the 2005 and 2009 sessions were sponsored by 




Representative John Davis, who owned a roofing company.  Since 2003, when legislation 
to license roofing contractors passed in the Senate but did not move in the House, the 
most progress that has been made by proponents of the issue was in 2013.  With three 
licensure bills for roofing contractors filed that year, House Bill 2693 was voted 
favorably out of the House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures by a 
vote of 6-1.  The bill next moved to the House Committee on Calendars, which schedules 
bills for votes by the full House where no action was ultimately taken on the bill.  
This latest attempt to license roofing contractors was, to some extent, a 
competition between organized political interests.  While the larger groups that supported 
licensure might have had more power in terms of membership size, it is clear that the 
smaller companies and individual workers who opposed the legislation were effective in 
getting their message across to legislators who were willing to oppose the bill.  Also, the 
fact that two influential conservative think tanks both registered opposition of the bill 
might have been a factor in its eventual stalling.  The debate over the legislation brought 
up some numbers of complaints regarding roofing contractors and increased costs in 
states with licensing requirements that served to bolster the comments made by several 
individuals opposing regulation.  On the other hand, any stated reasons for supporting the 
bill were largely hypothetical, as no facts and figures were offered that would help make 
the case.  The lack of questioning by the committee members, other than questions by 
Representative Boris Miles, who noted that he supported the bill, was noticeable.
House Bill 2693, as filed in 2013 by Representative Kenneth Sheets, defined a 
roofing contractor as follows:
An owner, officer, or director of a roofing business;




Someone who possesses direct or indirect control of at least 10 percent of 
the voting securities of a roofing business that is a corporation;
Someone who owns or possesses direct or indirect control of at least 
$25,000 of the fair market value of a roofing business;
Someone who directly or indirectly possesses the power to direct or cause 
the direction of the management of policies of a roofing business; or
Someone who has a direct or indirect interest in at least 10 percent of the 
profits, proceeds, or capital gains of a roofing business.
The bill was designed to impose a licensing requirement on anyone acting or offering to 
act in these capacities.  Licenses would have been valid for one year, and license holders 
would have been required to display their business name and license number on every 
vehicle owned by the contractor and used in providing roofing services.  Specific 
requirements would have been imposed as to the type of lettering that was used and 
where on the vehicles it was displayed.  The Texas Department of Licensing and 
Regulation (TDLR) would have been granted the authority to implement the provisions 
of the legislation, and anyone violating rules, whether or not they were a license holder, 
would have been subject to administrative penalties issued by TDLR.  If anyone violated 
licensing requirements of the legislation or performed roofing services without the 
required licensing, they could have faced criminal charges leading to a fine of up to $500 
and a suspension of their roofing license, if applicable (Texas Legislature 2013).
By the time that House Bill 2693 received a public hearing on April 9, 2013 
before the House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures, the bill had 
significantly changed to make the licensing requirement a voluntary registration program, 
much like what happened with the previously described legislation pertaining to 
foundation repair contractors.  Criminal penalties had been changed to pertain only to 
anyone who represents to the public that they were a registered roofing contractor when 




they were not registered with the state.  Sheets opened the hearing by saying that 
catastrophic events that do significant damage to roofs often lead to an influx of roofing 
contractors seeking work in affected areas.  According to Sheets, many of these people 
are looking to make money quickly and may be inexperienced, untrained, or unwilling to 
provide a high quality of work.  Sheets also explained that roofing contractors in this 
situation may not be bonded or insured.  According to Sheets, homeowners victimized by 
such problems would be left without recourse and the possibility of even further damage 
to homes, more insurance claims to make additional repairs, and because of this, would 
face higher insurance rates (Texas House Committee on Licensing and Administrative 
Procedures: April 9, 2013 Public Hearing 2013).
Representative Boris Miles, then a member of the Committee on Licensing and 
Administrative Procedures, questioned Sheets about why a licensing program would be 
voluntary.  Sheets responded that the program would be voluntary in order to get it
passed.  He further expressed his thoughts that his bill would have a very minimal impact 
on the marketplace and his assumption that good actors would register with the state, but 
bad ones won’t.  Miles then asked Sheets how rogue roofers who did not participate 
would be stopped from falsely representing to the public that they were registered under 
the program.  Sheets pointed to the criminal penalty in the bill for someone falsely 
representing themselves as a registered roofer and suggested that, if the bill was passed, 
additional penalties could be included in the rulemaking process.  Representative Four 
Price, also a member of the committee, questioned whether the Class C misdemeanor 
penalty in the bill (the lowest level of criminal penalty under Texas law) would be strong 




enough to be effective (Texas House Committee on Licensing and Administrative 
Procedures: April 9, 2013 Public Hearing 2013).
During the public hearing, 20 people registered in support of the bill.  Most of 
those in favor of the bill were affiliated with large roofing organizations such as the 
Roofing Contractors Association of Texas, Professional Roofing Standards Council, and 
Metal Roofs of Texas.  Others registering in support of the bill were affiliated with other 
influential groups such as the Texas Association of Realtors, the Texas Association of 
Business, the Independent Insurance Agents of Texas, and some individual insurance 
companies.  Registering in opposition to the bill during the hearing were 21 individuals, 
many representing themselves as “handymen” or as owners of small companies and 
others representing smaller roofing companies through the Texas Independent Roofing 
Contractors Association and the U.S. Hispanic Contractors Association.  The Texas 
Public Policy Foundation and Texans for Fiscal Responsibility, two influential 
conservative think tanks, also registered opposition to the bill (Texas House Committee 
on Licensing and Administrative Procedures: April 9, 2013 Public Hearing 2013).
Chris Crutcher, representing Outback Roofing Company, spoke in favor of the 
bill stating that his experience in the roofing industry led him to believe that the roofing 
industry lacked accountability to protect against bag actors.  He stated that the parameters 
of the bill would lead to a clear understanding of available options in the marketplace 
without overregulation, and that a voluntary registration program would allow good 
roofing contractors to validate what they already try to do for consumers.  Dave Custable, 
representing the North Texas Roofing Contractors Association, testified that the bill 
would be a win for consumers because he believed that legitimate contractors could not 




reasonably compete against the unethical sales approach and poor workmanship exhibited 
by bad actors.  Al Jurado, of the Texas Association of Realtors, indicated his support of 
the legislation, saying that his association often hears complaints about bad actors.  
However, Jurado did not mention any specific examples nor did any members of the 
committee ask him for examples.  Edis Oliver, of the Professional Roofing Standards 
Council, stated his support for the bill and his belief that the legislation would not raise 
the cost of doing business or penalize smaller contractors or legitimate contractors who 
chose not to register.  According to Joe Parks, of Metal Roofs of Texas, the legislation 
was needed so consumers would have a factual system to check and see whether 
companies are legitimate.  Parks stated his belief that other resources such as the Better 
Business Bureau and Angie’s List were not necessary factual and that it was very hard for 
large companies with higher costs to compete with smaller operators working from their 
tailgates (Texas House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures: April 9, 
2013 Public Hearing 2013).
Carl Isett, a former state legislator representing the Texas Independent Roofing 
Contractors Association, stated that his organization’s opposition to the bill had not 
changed even when the legislation was revised from a mandatory licensing program to a 
voluntary registration program.  According to Isett, small communities all over Texas 
could be miles away from large roofing companies, and people who did the best work in 
these communities were often “just a guy with a truck and a ladder” who were willing to 
work at a reasonable cost and had a good reputation.  Acknowledging that such roofers 
could choose not to register, Isett explained his fear that that if some contractors 
registered and others chose not to, those choosing not to would be seen as bad actors 




regardless of whether they had done anything wrong.  According to Isett, such a system 
would be like the state “saying there are good guys and bad guys.”  Furthermore, Isett 
pointed out that private industry certifications already existed in addition to information 
that can be found through sources such as the Better Business Bureau, Yelp, and Angie’s 
List.  “You can get this information without the government doing anything,” Isett said.  
Tom Bigger, an independent roofing contractor, spoke against the bill, stating that the 
roofing industry had thrived in Texas since 1836 with no regulation.  According to 
Bigger, registration would imply to the consumer that someone had been checked out and 
was qualified, which was not necessarily true, since there were no defined qualifications 
in the legislation to become a roofer.  Bigger said consumer education in general was 
important, and that his work depended on his reputation and recommendations from 
previous customers.  Bigger also stated that he is willing to provide liability insurance if 
the consumers are willing to cover the cost.  Therefore, the extra cost would be at the 
discretion of customers as opposed to everyone being faced with extra costs in the form 
of regulatory requirements.  
Keith Carson, the owner of Perfect Pitch Roofing, also testified against the 
legislation.  According to Carson, regulations would push costs up for everyone.  If some 
companies closed, he believed the lack of competition would push costs up even further, 
which would limit the financial capability of consumers to purchase roofing services.  
Carson also stated that he felt any similar legislation should have a sunset provision 
where it would be reviewed to make sure it did not have unintended consequences after 
taking effect.  Carson also stated that if the registration was voluntary and he continued 
working without registering, his customers probably would not care since he had 




previously done good work, implying that the lack of caring on the part of customers 
would lead to less effectiveness from the proposed registration program.  Frank Fuentes 
of the U.S. Hispanic Contractors Association also testified against the legislation.  Due to 
the original draft of the legislation being a requirement for mandatory licensure, Fuentes 
stated his belief that if the voluntary registration program passed, it would become 
mandatory over time.  In response to questioning from Representative Boris Miles about 
what happens when bad actors steal from consumers and rip them off, Fuentes questioned 
Miles about whether he knew how many roofing complaints were submitted to the Better 
Business Bureaus around the state.  According to Fuentes, in a year, there are about 1,500 
complaints submitted in regards to roofing contractors, some of which turn out to be 
legitimate while others do not.  Fuentes further stated that the number of legitimate 
complaints equaled a very small percentage of the amount of roofs installed in a given 
year in Texas.  Fuentes expressed surprise that the committee did not know the amount of 
complaints compared to the total number of roof installations saying, “We need to know 
that in considering legislation.”  
Tex Gilner testified against the legislation, stating that he had been in the roofing 
business since 1974.  He said that he had attended hearings on licensing legislation for 
several legislative sessions and asked why big roofing companies and insurance 
companies were so interested in making business unaffordable for smaller contractors.  
According to Gilner, consumer education was important as well as reminding consumers 
to check with local suppliers and friends and neighbors in their community who had 
roofing work performed.  He also expressed his opinion that regulation by the Texas 
Department of Insurance, as specified in the bill would be putting the “fox in charge of 




the henhouse.”  Representative Miles questioned Gilner about what he thought about 
instances where insurance checks might be turned over to the roofer in advance, but the 
roofer never returns to do the work.  Gilner stated that he did not take advance payments 
on any of his work but if that was a problem, he believed simple legislation to prohibit 
roofers from requiring any payments in advance would solve the problem.  In testifying 
against the legislation, Patrick Moran of the Austin Roofing Contractors Association 
echoed Gilner’s concerns about the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) being the 
regulatory authority, saying that as long as TDI was in charge, he believed insurance 
companies would benefit far more than roofers or consumers.  Moran also echoed earlier 
comments made by Fuentes, saying that the percentage of roofing jobs that turn out to be 
problematic due to faulty work is very small.  Moran said that liability insurance was cost 
prohibitive, as it could cost the contractor as much as 20 percent gross revenue.  Like 
Bigger stated earlier, Moran said that liability insurance could be helpful if the consumer 
wanted it, but that is why contractors offer different prices to consumer.  When 
questioning Moran about insurance figures, Representative Miles stated his belief that it 
was “atrocious” that a roofing contractor would charge extra for providing liability 
insurance.  Finally, Moran stated that he felt the legislation contained too much room for 
future regulatory expansion and that the idea he had heard regarding removing all bad 
actors from the industry was not realistic.  “Crooks are going to be in any business to 
some extent, no matter what,” he said.  
David Kettler, a roofing contractor with 42 years of experience, testified against 
the legislation, stating that private sector ratings such as those from the Better Business 
Bureau could accomplish everything intended by the legislation.  Kettler also stated that 




since most homeowners have property and casualty insurance, carrying liability insurance 
protects the roofers more than the homeowners.  Kettler also addressed the issue of 
regulatory costs being passed on to consumers, stating that out of the 50 states and 
Washington, D.C., 30 locations do not require licensing while 21 do.  According to 
Kettler, his research showed that the 21 locations regulating the roofing industry had an 
average roofing job cost of 8 percent more than in states without licensing restrictions.  
Furthermore, comparing Gulf Coast states that had regulations to Texas and others who 
did not, he estimated that licensing raised prices by 15 percent in those areas.  Kettler also 
expressed concerns that the legislation, if passed, might lead to a further expansion of 
regulation.  Stacy Pearson, a roofing contractor with 27 years of experience, also testified 
against the bill.  Pearson said he owned only one truck, three ladders, carried no liability 
insurance, and made a living by going door to door to leave business cards as consumers 
would often keep his cards and call him when they needed roofing work done.  Over his 
career, Pearson said he had completed over 15,000 jobs in that manner.  Pearson further 
stated that he felt that large companies with more overhead were not able to compete with 
services such as his on prices, so they had been lobbying in favor of regulations, 
something that showed that the goal of passing the legislation would eventually be to 
increase the regulatory burden.  He also indicated that any roofers who steal or commit 
fraud can be prosecuted under existing criminal statutes.  Hector Uribe, of the Hispanic 
Contractors Association de Tejas echoed these comments, saying that problems can be 
dealt with in criminal courts without asking the legislature “to fix every problem that 
every individual has.”  In response to earlier comments from Representative Miles about 
the need to take a first step towards correcting problems in the roofing industry, Uribe 




indicated that it would be “better to take no steps than the wrong step.”  Daniel Simon, a 
self-employed roofing contractor, opposed the bill and in his testimony, discussed a few 
municipalities that had regulations in place.  According to Simon, his cost of doing 
business had already increased in those areas but said he believed the problem that 
supporters of the legislation were trying to address was “microscopic” and that most 
complaints could be resolved without the legal system.  Leo Wadley, a retired roofing 
contractor, also testified against the bill.  Wadley pointed out that although the bill was 
described as being for consumer protection, it did not cover homebuilders and 
remodelers.  According to Wadley, the likelihood of having bad actors in those areas of 
work is just as high as it would be for roofers (Texas House Committee on Licensing and 
Administrative Procedures: April 9, 2013 Public Hearing 2013).
House Bill 2693 was voted favorably out of the Committee on Licensing and 
Administrative Procedures by a vote of 6-1 and sent to the Committee on Calendars, 
which sets legislation for a floor vote.  The bill never moved forward in the Committee 
on Calendars.     
Roofing contractors are currently licensed in 21 states.  It is unknown why they 
have become licensed in some states and not others, but the arguments about the need to 
protect property owners may be compelling in many states, regardless of whether anyone 
actually checks to see if there is a problem.  Since this type of licensing has been 
promoted since 1997, it would not be unlikely for the legislation to return in a future 
legislative session.





During the 2013 session of the Texas Legislature, Senate Bill 1312 was filed to 
require licensure of veterinary technicians by the Texas Board of Veterinary Medical 
Examiners.  This legislation, which had not been filed in previous sessions, established a 
new advisory committee to develop an exam for potential veterinary technicians.  
The lack of any organized opposition is noteworthy in the case of this legislation.
Despite a comment made by Senator Charles Schwertner about the possibility for 
punitive regulatory action to be helpful, no senator or representative ever questioned 
whether there were problems in the previous system of veterinary technicians not being
regulated by the state.  No one ever raised questions as to whether technicians had ever 
been accused of engaging in unethical behavior or whether licensure requirements would 
represent a significant barrier to individuals seeking to enter the occupation.  It was said 
several times that most practitioners already working in the field supported licensure and 
they had every reason to do so, concerning the legislation grandfathered them into the 
requirements regardless of whether they would meet the new qualifications while new 
potential competitors in the job market would have to go through the entire licensing 
process.  It is also noteworthy that the House sponsor of the legislation, as well as another 
member of the committee initially considering the legislation in the House, were both 
retired veterinarians who likely worked with their industry to facilitate the bill’s passage.  
The fact that the industry was supportive of the bill and the lack of influential groups 
opposing the licensing requirement seemed to translate into a lack of opposition among 
legislators.




Senate Bill 1312 set forth requirements that in order to become licensed, an 
individual must meet the following qualifications:
Passage of a jurisprudence examination as determined by the Texas Board 
of Veterinary Medical Examiners:
Being at least 18 years of age; 
Graduation from a program accredited by the American Veterinary 
Medical Association;
Passage of the Veterinary Technician National Examination;
Passage of a criminal background check
The legislation also contained requirements for displaying a veterinary technician’s 
license in the workplace and for the continuing education.  The legislation set forth the 
scope of practice for a veterinary technician, and described actions that could lead to 
license denial or disciplinary action (Texas Legislature 2013).
The first public hearing on Senate Bill 1312 was held on April 8, 2013 in the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Rural Affairs, and Homeland Security.  Nine people, 
mostly associated with organized veterinary-related interests, registered in favor of the 
bill.  The Texas Farm Bureau, which is very influential, especially with rural legislators, 
also registered in favor of the legislation.  There was no registered opposition.  Senator 
Charles Schwertner, author of the legislation, stated that at the time, many technicians 
chose to register in a private credentialing program through the Texas Veterinary Medical 
Association.  Schwertner also said that practitioners in the field wanted the regulatory 
requirement to be put in place, and stated his belief that licensing was better than a 
private credentialing program because under licensing, punitive action could be taken if 
necessary.  Senator Carlos Uresti, a member of the committee considering the legislation, 
questioned Schwertner about whether professionals already working in the occupation 
that had passed the private credentialing exam would have to take another exam in order 




to become licensed.  Schwertner replied that current practitioners would be grandfathered 
into licensing and would not have to meet additional requirements.  David Sessum, a 
veterinary technician and a member of the Texas Association of Registered Veterinary 
Technicians, testified in favor of the bill and compared the licensing regime to the 
professional pathway for medical professionals.  Cynthia Dittmar, also a veterinary 
technician with the same association, testified that the  requirements for licensure would 
help people understand who would be taking care of their pets and what their credentials 
were (Texas Senate Committee on Agriculture, Rural Affairs, and Homeland Security: 
April 8, 2013 Public Hearing 2013).
A hearing on an identical bill requiring the licensure of veterinary technicians, 
House Bill 1621, took place in the House Committee on Agriculture and Livestock on 
April 3, 2013.  Representative Jimmie Don Aycock, a retired veterinarian and the author 
of the House bill, introduced the legislation by saying that licensure was important 
because veterinary technicians would be clearly regulated on what they could do and 
what degree of supervision by a licensed veterinarian was necessary (Texas House 
Committee on Agriculture and Livestock: April 3, 2013 Public Hearing 2013).
Dr. Tracy Colvin, president of the Texas Veterinary Medical Association, testified 
in favor of the bill stating that 84 percent of technicians choosing to register in private 
certification programs wanted to become licensed.  She stated that these individuals had, 
at minimum, graduated with an associate’s degree, passed a registration exam, and 
maintained continuing education requirements.  According to Dr. Colvin, 38 other states 
were licensing veterinary technicians at the time and it would be helpful to veterinarians 
to have licensure for their technicians.  Representative Charles Anderson, a member of 




the committee considering the legislation and also a retired veterinarian, pointed out that 
veterinarians were not required to hire technicians, and those who chose not to would not 
be subject to the regulations in the legislation.  Dittmar, who had previously testified in 
the Senate committee hearing, also testified in support of the House bill, saying that 
licensure would be a way to make sure that people without training  or education were 
not hired by veterinarians and that it would be a way to make sure a professional 
atmosphere was maintained.  Sessum also testified in the House hearing, saying that 
licensure would add value to someone’s education in the field.  He pointed out that, if the 
bill passed, unlicensed individuals could still work for veterinarians, but just would have 
limits on what they could do in order to keep them from performing tasks requiring a 
license (Texas House Committee on Agriculture and Livestock: April 3, 2013 Public 
Hearing 2013).
When Senate Bill 1312 was considered on the floor of the Senate, no questions 
were asked of Senator Schwertner and the bill passed unanimously.  On May 3, 2013, the 
bill was introduced to the full House and won its final passage on May 4, 2013 by a vote 
of 82-50 (Texas House of Representatives: May 4, 2013 Floor Session 2013). The fact 
that 50 representatives voted against the bill was unusual, considering the fact that there 
was no organized opposition to the bill and that no House members questioned 
Representative Aycock on the floor.  The legislation was signed into law by Governor 
Rick Perry on June 4, 2013.
Texas became the 39th state to license veterinary technicians.  Other states leave 
the specific credentialing requirements to the veterinarians who hire technicians, and a 
number of private certification programs exist in those areas.  




Part Two: Results of Empirical Study on Texas Occupations
A linear probability model was used to test the degree to which the independent 
variables predict whether or not an occupation is licensed by the state of Texas. Table 
12, shown on Page 106, summarizes the results using this model. The r-square figure 
shows that almost 32 percent of the variation in the dependent variable can be explained 
by one or more of the independent variables. The significance of F shows that the model 
is a good fit and that for every unit of increase in the number of states requiring licensing, 
the dependent variable increases by 0.0163. Therefore, the likelihood of licensure in 
Texas increases by 1.63 percent as each additional state has a licensing requirement for 
an occupation. With a p-value of 0.01401, the results suggest that the amount of other 
states requiring occupational licenses for a given occupation is a significant predictor of 
whether or not the occupation is licensed in Texas.  This is similar to what was found in 
the case studies, where legislative testimony indicated a contagion effect.  Licensing 
requirements in other states are often used as a reason for licensing an occupation in 
Texas. Therefore, for the variable of the number of states that require licensing in an 
occupation, the null hypothesis can be rejected, even at the one percent level of 
significance. Slightly significant as a predictor of whether occupational licensing is 
required in Texas is the accident rate for an occupation, although the impact is slightly 
negative.  While it might seem more likely for the impact to be positive, the case studies 
help give context to this.  In the six examples from case studies, it is suggested that health 
and safety concerns, such as accident rates, are scarcely considered.  While it is unlikely 
that these results demonstrate that Texas policymakers are deliberately requiring 




licensing for less dangerous occupations as opposed to more dangerous occupations, it 
does likely demonstrate that level of danger is not usually seriously considered.
Table 12: Results of Empirical Study on Texas Occupations
Dependent variable = Coefficient P-value
Occupational licensing requirement (Standard error)
# of states requiring licensing 0.0163 **
(0.005)











* p < 0.10
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01 
Based on other p-values, it is not possible to know if the other independent variables 
(lobbying budget for the occupation and the organizational structure of the occupation) 
are a predictor of whether or not occupational licensing will be required in the 
occupation.  Therefore, the null hypotheses for these variables cannot be rejected.
Part Three: Results of Empirical Study of Occupational Licensing Across the United 
States
 A probit regression model was used to test the degree to which the independent 
variables predict whether or not the occupation of behavior analysts is licensed in each of 




the 50 states and in the District of Columbia.  The occupation of behavior analysts was 
chosen for this test because licensing is required in almost half of all states, but not in the 
remainder.  Also, proposals for licensing behavior analysts have been offered in states 
where licensing is not required in recent years, but they have not passed.  These situations 
suggest that current factors of some sort are driving the licensing process in certain states 
while causing licensing requirements to fail in other states.  Shown below in Table 13,
the probability of Chi-square shows that the model is significant.
Table 13: Probit Regression                                                                                  
licenseanalysts Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
membershipsper1000population -2.38194 9.854406 -0.24 0.809 -21.69622 16.93234
membershipoper1000population -10.82676 3.628054 -2.98 0.003 -17.93761 -3.715903
percapitaincome .0000202 .0000553 0.37   0.715 -.0000882 .0001287
urban .0395301 .0323754 1.22 0.222 -.0239246 .1029848
populationdensity -.0013765 .00181 -0.76 0.447 -.004924 .002171
conservatism -.0779716 .1036699 -0.75 0.452 -.2811609 .1252177
democrats .0711012 .0706414 1.01 0.314 -.0673534 .2095558
numberlicocc -.0240136 .0120575 -1.99 0.046 -.0476458 -.0003814
paternalism -.8264449 .6556035 -1.26 0.207 -2.111404 .4585144
geo1 -.4955923 1.181408  -0.42 0.675 -2.81111 1.819926
geo2 -.9695851 .7512076 -1.29 0.197 -2.441925 .5027547
geo3 -.1550752 1.08484 -0.14 0.886 -2.281322 1.971172
_cons 1.828664 8.054069 0.23 0.820 -13.95702 17.61435
                                                                                                                             Number of obs     =         51
                                                                                                                             LR chi2(13)       =      21.96
                                                                                                                             Prob > chi2       =     0.0559
Log likelihood = -24.280618                                                                               Pseudo R2         =     0.3114
The independent variable that has the greatest impact on the dependent variable is the 
number of members of groups opposing occupational licensing requirements for behavior 
analysts.  At -10.82676, a strong negative impact is shown which means with higher 
levels of membership in opposing groups, the result is pushed towards no licensing 
requirements.  This result is similar to what was observed in the case studies where well 
organized political interests opposing licensing tended to have success as the proposals 
that they opposed did not pass. It is also suggested in the literature that strong group 




opposition to licensing requirements can have an effect on whether licensing proposals 
become law. At -0.0240136, the number of licensed occupations in the state has a very 
small negative impact on whether the occupation of behavior analysts will have licensing 
requirements.  While it may seem logical to think that states already requiring licensing 
in many other occupations would be likely to license behavior analysts, pushback against 
licensing too many occupations may also occur, as shown in the case studies.  If that is 
the case in other states, then legislators may prefer to approach new licensing 
requirements with caution.
Table 14, shown below, summarizes the marginal effects from the probit model.
Table 14: Marginal Effects After Probit                                                        
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] X
membershipsper1000population -.909194 3.76883 -0.24 0.809 -8.29597 6.47758 .050886
membershipoper1000population -4.132608 1.42692 -2.90 0.004 -6.92932 -1.3359 .150647
percapitaincome 7.72e-06 .00002 0.36 0.716 -.000034 .000049 40411.9
urban .0150888 .01141 1.32 0.186 -.00727 .037448 74.0998
populationdensity -.0005254 .00064 -0.82 0.415 -.001788 .000737 378.338
conservatism -.0779716 .03961 -0.75 0.452 -.107395 .047871 38.5882
democrats .0271396 .02749 0.99 0.323 -.026734 .081013 49.6333
numberlicocc -.0091661 .0047 -1.95 0.051 -.018369 .000037 92.8824
paternalism -.3140677 .24706 -1.27 0.204 -.798303 .170168 .607843
geo1 -.1796026 .38696 -0.46 0.643 -.938023 .578818 .254902
geo2 -.3229803 .19448  -1.66 0.097 -.704163 .058202 .235294
geo3 -.0581919 .402 -0.14 0.885 -.846094 .729711 .176471
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                                                                                 y  = Pr(licenseanalysts) (predict)
                                                                                                                                        =   .3831447
 
 






Part One: Conclusions- Case Studies
As noted earlier in this work, six cases are not necessarily conclusive about 
occupational licensing in the state of Texas.  However, the case studies do present some 
important information about the process of occupational licensing in the state, as well as 
its effects. Some of the insights gained from the case studies support the existing 
literature, and others add to it, especially considering that only a small amount of 
information has been written about occupational licensing as a result of the policymaking 
process. The following conclusions are based on observations that were noticeable in all 
six case studies.
1. In each of the case studies, many members of the occupation for which 
licensing requirements were being considered were strongly supportive of licensing 
legislation.  In the case studies, licensing was never proposed without strong support 
from at least some practitioners in the industry.  When an industry was not unanimous in 
its support for licensing, which was the case for anesthesiology assistants, foundation 
repair contractors, and roofing contractors, the opposition was generated by competing 
organized interests who were afraid that higher costs or increased regulatory burdens 
would harm their ability to work in their occupation.  Very rarely did an organized 
interest actually represent consumers and even in the few instances of consumer groups 




registering in support of legislation, no specific examples were offered of consumers 
suffering harm because of unregulated practitioners in the occupations in question.  
2. In each case study, very little in the way of factual data was presented on 
the costs or benefits of licensure.  Supporters of occupational licensing, both legislators 
and members of the public who registered in support of licensing legislation, presented 
hypothetical situations of danger that might exist and insisted that licensing would 
reduce the level of danger to the public.  With the exception of some roofing contractors 
who were opposed to licensing requirements in their industry and cited data that showed 
that problems with the occupation in its unregulated state were minimal while costs were 
significantly higher in states with licensing, no one supporting or opposing licensing 
legislation really attempted to justify their claims.  Also, during questioning in 
committee hearings and on the House and Senate floors, no legislators ever asked for 
this information.  In the case of associate auctioneers and veterinary technicians, 
supporters of the legislation never even claimed that there were bad actors in the 
industry or that licensing would lead to better outcomes.  No legislators even asked for 
such basic details on those two pieces of legislation.  This leads to two possible thoughts 
about legislators involved in the occupational licensing process.  First of all, those who 
author legislation may not anticipate questions about costs and benefits being asked, 
which is why they do not work such information into the layout of their legislation.  It 
would also indicate that their past experience tells them that they are not likely to be 
asked.  As to why other legislators do not ask for information, it is possible that since 
politics often determines their support or opposition, they are really sometimes not in 
search of details necessary to make an informed decision on the issue.




3. Literature suggests that occupational licensing may benefit existing
practitioners in an occupation, but the case studies show that it may create or expand 
demand for licensed services at the expense of related service providers.  Legislative 
debates over occupational licensing seem to often focus on exclusivity of who gets to 
perform certain work or, as it was referred to in one public hearing, “turf wars.”  For 
example, nursing groups opposed licensure for anesthesiology assistants, because they 
wanted people from their occupation, such as registered nurse anesthesiologists, to be 
allowed to do the work without additional regulatory barriers.  Similarly, general 
“handymen” contractors tended to oppose licensure for foundation repair contractors and 
roofing contractors.  Even if these individuals did not do much work that would have 
fallen under the licensure, they would have either had to become licensed or just focus 
on other work, running the risk that competing handymen might become licensed and   
end up getting more other work as well just because of the convenience of hiring one 
contractor who would be able to do everything necessary in a renovation project, for 
example.  Therefore, rent seeking may not only be successful if barriers to entry are 
erected, but it may also be successful due to the legal right to do more than related 
service providers without licensure can do.
4. Legislative debates over occupational licensing do not occur and then fade 
away, resolved by either support of or opposition to licensure.  Instead, it is likely that 
interest groups will be very persistent in anticipation of being able to take advantage of a 
changing legislative atmosphere, new committee chairmen or members, getting 
legislation routed to a totally different committee, or some other political development 
that leaves them with hope after previously suffering a defeat.  In the case studies 




examined in this work, this was evident as roofing contractors have been seeking 
licensure requirements for 18 years.  Anesthesiology assistants have now sought 
licensing requirements for eight years, while foundation repair contractors have 
supported licensing legislation for six years.  It is very likely that the question of 
whether or not to require licensing for individuals in these occupations will be back in 
front of the legislature in the near future.
5. Supporters of occupational licensing requirements seem to catch 
momentum based on what is happening in similar occupations or in other states.  One of 
the most commonly discussed reasons for occupational licensing is that some other 
occupation, which is usually said to pose an equal or lesser danger to the public, already 
has licensing requirements.  Many supporters of licensing requirements for 
anesthesiology assistants made this argument in regards to other operating room 
employees who were required to hold occupational licenses.  They also argued that they 
should be licensed because some other states required licensure in their occupation, an 
argument also heard from the veterinary technicians who wished to be licensed.  
Supporters of occupational licensing for foundation repair contractors often mentioned 
that other home repair-related occupations were licensed including plumbers and 
electricians.  Based on these observations, it seems likely that occupational licensing, at 
least to a certain extent, is self-sustaining and this may also explain part of the quick 
increase in the number of licensed occupations in recent years.
6. Interest groups and practitioners seem to seek occupational licensing not 
just because of financial interests, but also because they gain additional utility from the 
status of being a license holder.  In the case studies of anesthesiology assistants and 




veterinary technicians, it was implied that licensing was deserved due to the education 
and training that unlicensed practitioners still had to complete.  Also, licensing often 
allows practitioners to use specific titles such as “licensed veterinary technician” that 
other unlicensed people doing almost identical work would not be able to use.  In the 
cases of foundation repair contractors and roofing contractors, even after the proposals 
were changed to create voluntary registration programs, it can be assumed that 
practitioners choosing to register and be on an official listing maintained by the state  
would derive utility from such a system, especially compared to competitors who chose 
not to register.  This may partly explain why interest groups seek licensing requirements 
for their occupations regardless of whether they would be likely to see a wage increase.
7. In all six case studies, certain practitioners were strongly supportive of 
occupational licensing legislation for their occupations.  However, the level of organized 
opposition seemed to be the main difference when considering which legislation passed 
and which did not pass.  For associate auctioneers, forensic analysts, and veterinary 
technicians, there was no organized opposition, very few questions were asked by 
legislators, and the bills easily passed.  Organized opposition seemed to bring a different 
result.  In the case of anesthesiology assistants, foundation repair contractors, and roofing 
contractors, there was organized opposition, extensive testimony from witnesses, and the 
bills were ultimately defeated.  In the case of roofing contractors, the bill never made it 
through the House Committee on Calendars to be considered by the full House, which 
could be an indication that, once the bill left the House Committee on Licensing and 
Administrative Procedures, opposing individuals and groups concentrated on lobbying 
members of the Calendars committee.




Part Two: Conclusions on Empirical Study of Texas Occupations
In Texas, it is somewhat difficult to predict the factors regarding why a specific 
occupation would or would not require licensing.  Since policymakers often act to 
establish or change requirements with very little information presented, there are few 
indicators as to what might predict the success of a specific proposal.  The best predictor 
of whether or not an occupation will be licensed in Texas is the number of other states in 
which the occupation is licensed.  In both the literature and the case studies presented 
earlier in this dissertation, it became obvious that individuals and groups supporting 
licensing requirements often pointed to the number of other states with similar 
requirements as justification for their proposal.  The literature suggests that occupational 
licensing is somewhat self-perpetuating, which seems to be indicated by the fact that as 
more states license an occupation, it becomes more likely that the same occupation will 
require licensing in Texas.
Despite the fact that health and safety concerns are one of the most commonly 
stated reasons for individuals and groups to support occupational licensing requirements, 
occupations with higher accident rates are not a significant factor in whether or not an 
occupation is licensed in Texas.  This statement is not intended to suggest that 
policymakers deliberately require licensing for exceptionally safe occupations, while 
ignoring problematic occupations.  Instead, it is just one more thing that points to the lack 
of attention given to this issue.  The six Texas case studies demonstrated that information 
is rarely presented showing whether or not an occupation being considered for licensing 
has important public health or safety concerns.  Legislators who offer proposals rarely 
mention any type of specific concerns, other than hypothetical situations that could occur 




without regulations.  Also, their colleagues rarely ever ask them for any information.  
Virtually no debate takes place regarding the overall costs and benefits of specific 
licensing legislation.  As the case studies demonstrate, if no members of the public are 
present to testify for or against legislation, committee hearings sometimes only take a few 
minutes and floor debate sometimes only consists of the bill author using a few sentences 
to describe key features of the legislation, no questions being asked, and a vote taken 
immediately afterward.  Although some legislators are probably doing research on their 
own and casting informed votes on licensing legislation, the lack of information being 
discussed on the record seems to show an overall lower level of interest in determining 
the costs and benefits of such legislation when compared to other types of legislation that 
may be debated for hours.  Therefore, the fact that legislators are not requiring licensing 
in areas that have more documented safety concerns comes as no surprise.
Lobbying and political influence by groups is undoubtedly helpful to whatever 
causes they champion, including the passage of legislation requiring occupational 
licensing in their field.  However, when looking at 45 different occupations, the amount 
of money spent on lobbying was not significant.  This is likely due to one reason.  Out of 
the occupations studied, some of them have had licensing requirements that have been 
established for years.  Since bills to deregulate occupations or reduce occupational 
licensing requirements rarely even advance as far as a public hearing in the Texas 
Legislature, it seems likely that groups supporting established requirements do not need 
to spend as much on lobbying in order to maintain their requirements.  It is likely that 
groups who are just beginning to push for licensing requirements or those who have 
relatively new requirements are going to use more resources in order to build good 




relationships with legislators and to tout their idea of the benefits of licensing 
requirements.  It also stands to reason that some groups who begin spending heavily on 
lobbying during a given session may not even have a current occupational licensing 
proposal, but may be laying groundwork to bring something forward in the future.  
Therefore, there may be a correlation between amounts spent on lobbying and success in 
a licensing proposal being passed at some point, but the timing is different for each 
occupation, which is why the level of spending on lobbying is not significant.
Part Three: Conclusions on Empirical Study of Occupational Licensing Across the 
United States
1. Out of the variables tested, the most significant variable in determining 
which of the 50 states will require occupational licensing for behavior analysts is the per 
capita membership numbers in groups who oppose occupational licensing requirements 
for behavior analysts.  This is a finding that is supported by both the literature and the 
case studies detailed in this dissertation, as it suggests that the decision of whether or not 
to require occupational licensing in a specific occupation is often the result of a battle 
between organized political interests, with the interests that are the most well organized 
winning the battle.  Furthermore, if it is a battle between organized political interests, it 
stands to reason that larger numbers in groups opposing licensure would be significant in 
determining whether or not licensing requirements were enacted.  This, too, was 
supported by the case studies as licensing proposals opposed by vocal, well organized 
groups often failed while those with little or no opposition often passed.




2. The number of licensed occupations in the state has a very small negative 
impact on whether the occupation of behavior analysts will have licensing requirements.  
While it may seem logical to think that states already requiring licensing in many other 
occupations would be likely to license behavior analysts, pushback against licensing too 
many occupations may also occur, as shown in the case studies.  Whether or not there is 
a certain “tipping point” after which more licensing requirements lead to stricter scrutiny 
for the need for licensing would be a valid question for another study.
Part Four: Policy Recommendations
Based on the literature review and the results of the case studies and the statistical 
tests, several recommendations have been developed that will assist Texas legislators and 
regulatory authorities in the state as they consider future changes to existing occupational 
licensing requirements or newly proposed requirements.
1. Lawmakers should work to make sure that licensing requirements have a 
clear purpose in protecting public health and safety and that requirements are not overly 
broad or burdensome.  If there is no clear purpose in protecting health and safety, 
lawmakers should question the value of licensing requirements.  In other cases, 
alternative forms of occupational regulation exist that would meet the stated policy goals 
of licensing without some of the burdensome restrictions imposed by licensing.
Certification would allow practitioners in an occupation the option of 
getting the training or experience necessary to achieve a high standard, 
but would not force them to do so.  Therefore, consumers who valued 
the information function of occupational licensing would be able to 
choose a certified practitioner and, if applicable, pay the premium that 
came with higher standards while other consumers would not be 
restricted from hiring non-certified individuals who chose to work in 
the occupation.  Certification could be designed in many ways, and 
could even be achieved outside of a government agency.  The 
Goldwater Institute has promoted a model of private certification, 




which would let education and training providers for an occupation 
certify their members in lieu of government licensing (Slivinski 2015).
The state legislature, if it chose, could require the state to publish lists 
of certified providers if policymakers were concerned about the 
public’s ability to access information.  Indiana is currently a state that 
has a system which publishes lists of privately certified individuals
(Slivinski 2015).  While it is a fairly new system, policymakers in 
Texas should observe it and consider adopting such a system if it 
benefits the public while reducing burdens associated with 
occupational regulation by the government.  In either a government 
operated system of certification or a private system, the certification 
could be revoked if a practitioner no longer met higher standards or 
chose not to complete required continuing education requirements.
Registration is used to simply maintain a list of practitioners in a given 
occupation who choose to register, publish certain information on 
qualifications, and pay a fee.  This is a system that is not very 
burdensome and, if operated in a voluntary manner, would allow 
consumers to access information if they chose without restricting who 
could work in an occupation.  Also, registration programs could be 
operated by private industry groups for practitioners who meet their 
standards.  In this case, lawmakers could choose to require the state to 
publish the information if they saw a need to do so.
Insurance or bonding requirements, in some cases, might be a good 
way to address concerns with risk to the public.  Bonding would work 
where companies or practitioners would be required to maintain a fund 
against which claims could be made.  Insurance requirements would 
simply require companies or individuals to purchase insurance with 
the necessary amount of coverage.  For instance, bonding or insurance 
requirements would go quite far in addressing stated concerns for taxi 
drivers and people who offer “ride sharing” services such as through 
Uber and Lyft, an industry where licensing is said to be very 
burdensome and there are many current discussions about the extent to 
which occupational licensing is necessary.
Regulating businesses for basic health and safety requirements could 
be an alternative to requiring licenses for individual workers.  In fact, 
if a business was subject to regular health and safety inspections, it is 
likely that more health and safety concerns would be quickly 
addressed as opposed to waiting on a consumer complaint to work its 
way through the procedures of a licensing authority.  This is very 
similar to the way that most restaurants are regulated.  Individual 
employees are not required to hold licenses, but health departments 
conduct regular inspections and may order corrective action if they 
find violations.  This would work best in an occupation where health 




and safety concerns are possible, but have little to do with individual 
practitioners.  For instance, health and safety concerns with barber 
shops usually center on things such as the cleanliness of the shop and 
the sanitization of the equipment.  Therefore, as an alternative to 
licensing individual barbers and imposing burdensome licensing 
requirements, policymakers could simply choose to regulate barber 
shops through periodic health and safety inspections.
As lawmakers seek to determine what type of occupational regulation, if any, is 
necessary in a given situation, they should also determine how the regulations will be 
enforced.  As licensing comes to have more requirements, it is likely that more resources 
will be needed to operate a licensing program and conduct enforcement.  Lawmakers 
should attempt to determine whether enough resources will be available in the budget to 
administer and enforce regulations and if the availability of resources is in question, they 
should look to other alternatives.
2. If lawmakers determine that occupational licensing is necessary for a 
given occupation, they should narrowly tailor requirements to only address the specific 
public health and safety concerns relevant to the work that will be performed.  The 
literature, along with the case studies conducted earlier in this dissertation, suggests that 
existing practitioners in many occupations seek to raise their own standards.  Despite 
whatever their stated reasons for doing so may be, legislators should not be quick to 
adopt higher standards if they are not tailored to specific health and safety concerns.  
Also, if lawmakers believe there is a genuine concern that should be addressed by way of 
occupational licensing, they should seek to determine what other states require 
occupational licensing in the given profession.  Then, they should study whether or not 
other states have benefited from the proposals and let the requirements of the state that 




uses the least restrictive practices necessary to meet its goals guide them in their own 
licensing proposal.  
3. If occupational licensing is required in a given occupation, legislators 
should make sure that practitioners are legally allowed to practice to the greatest extent of 
their education and training.  In reviewing the literature, it became apparent that “scope 
of practice” issues often became turf wars for practitioners who provided similar or 
overlapping services.  By restricting individuals from practicing to the full extent of their 
training, legislators are causing one or more groups to benefit from reduced competition 
at the expense of those who are restricted from practicing.  In Texas, many people feel 
that highly educated and trained workers such as medical assistants, physical therapists, 
nurse practitioners, and dental hygienists are not allowed to work to the full scope of their 
training.  While it would be helpful to people working in the occupations, it would also 
be helpful in providing more access to services that might be currently restricted to 
doctors and dentists, who are fewer in supply.  Also, with more people providing 
services, costs would likely decrease, something that would be good for consumers trying 
to stretch health care dollars.
4. Texas policymakers should consider cutting back on restrictions for 
workers with criminal records who are trying to obtain an occupational license.  In some 
cases, licensing statutes in Texas specify that individuals with certain convictions may 
not obtain licenses.  In most cases, however, it is left to each licensing agency to 
determine through administrative rules.  Some adopt regulations that refer broadly to 
things such as “good moral character” being necessary to obtain and keep a license.  In 
practice, this sometimes means that individuals with any criminal record whatsoever are 




banned from working in the occupation.  It makes sense that lawmakers would not want 
someone convicted of crimes affecting children to be able to teach or coach in a public 
school.  What is less clear, however, is why people with convictions unrelated to public 
health, safety, or the work that they will be doing may face blanket ineligibility for a 
license or why people who had a misdemeanor criminal conviction decades ago could not 
work in some fields.  While a barber shop, a plumbing business, or any other 
establishment might not want to hire a worker with a criminal record and would have a 
right not to do so, it seems that others might want to give someone a chance.  A 
particularly good example of why this type of policy needs reform is the case of Jama’ar 
Brown, a barber from San Antonio, Texas.  Brown had worked as a licensed barber in 
Texas for approximately five years when he went to prison on drug charges.  While in 
prison, Brown was assigned to cut and style other inmates’ hair due to his qualifications 
in his line of work.  Upon his release, he found an employer who was willing to hire him, 
but could not get the Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation to reinstate his 
barber license.  Not only did Brown’s conviction have nothing to do with his job, but 
there is no apparent reason that the state should let him perform barbering services for 
other inmates, but not for the public upon his release from confinement.  In other 
documented cases in Texas, licenses for nurses and teachers were revoked at the mere 
accusation of wrongdoing, despite the fact that the individuals were ultimately never 
charged with or convicted of a crime.  At a very minimum, lawmakers should consider 
revising the law in a way that was proposed in House Bill 551, authored by State 
Representative Eric Johnson, during the 2015 legislative session.  Johnson’s bill would 
have prohibited a licensing authority from suspending, revoking, or denying an 




occupational license on the grounds of a criminal conviction without first giving the 
person a chance to appear at a formal meeting of the authority and present their testimony 
and evidence in favor of themselves holding a license.  House Bill 551 was referred to the 
House Committee on Licensing and Administrative Procedures, but never received a 
public hearing.  Since almost four percent of Texas adults are currently in jail or prison or 
on parole or probation and as many as one-third of all adults have at least some type of 
misdemeanor criminal conviction, failure to reform this part of the law could lead to 
extremely high rates of unemployment among individuals with criminal records as well 
as the lack of well-trained practitioners to work in many different types of jobs.  The lack 
of jobs for individuals with criminal records is commonly tied to recidivism and other 
social problems, about which policymakers should be concerned.
5. Even if lawmakers determine that licensing is necessary due to health and 
safety concerns, they should consider tailoring their policies in a way that does not 
criminalize work itself.  The literature raised many questions about the punishments for 
unlicensed practice in various occupations.  Most people likely understand why an 
unqualified individual impersonating a medical doctor could be charged as a criminal and 
how that would carry a risk to the public’s health and safety.  Fewer people, however, are 
likely to understand why someone could be charged as a criminal for working as an 
unlicensed barber or for using the title “registered interior designer” without the proper 
certification.  Both of these are examples of criminal penalties that workers may face in 
Texas and such penalties could carry fines, jail time, or both.  These criminal statutes are 
enforced, as the case of Texas auctioneer Drake King illustrates.  After another 
auctioneer complained that King was working as an unlicensed auctioneer, he was 




arrested by the Texas Department of Public Safety on the charge of working without a 
license.  He spent six days in jail and pleaded guilty to a Class B misdemeanor which, in 
Texas, equates his offense of working as an auctioneer without a license to being 
convicted of driving while intoxicated, assault causing bodily injury, or any number of 
other Class B misdemeanor crimes in Texas.  King would likely now face a hard time 
obtaining many Texas licenses, due to the fact that he now has a criminal record.  
Practitioners who would commit crimes against the public could already be prosecuted 
for those crimes under existing criminal statutes.  Licensing authorities have the power to 
write administrative rules and determine administrative fines for those violating the rules, 
including working without a license.  Therefore, the ability to convict someone as a 
criminal just for the offense of working without a license does not appear to serve much 
purpose in regards to the well-being of the public.  Legislators should consider repealing 
any statutes that only act to criminalize work.
6. Legislators should study the manner in which fees for new licenses, 
renewals, and other purposes are set.  Ideally, programs for state required licensing, 
registration, or certification would be revenue neutral.  However, it is often suggested that 
such programs often generate more revenue than the cost of operating the programs, 
which means that lawmakers often have the ability to use money for other areas in the 
state budget.  A discussion of this occurred on April 22, 2013 as the Texas House of 
Representatives debated the merits of requiring licensing for interior designers and now-
retired State Representative Jim Pitts, who then served as chairman of the budget-writing 
House Appropriations Committee, noted during the debate that the fees paid in through 
the licensing program generated $1 million in extra revenue that helped fund public 




education.  This does not seem appropriate, as it puts a larger burden of paying for 
general state government on workers in certain occupations.  When this is the case in 
Texas, lawmakers should take action to reduce fees to the appropriate level.
7. Texas should use strong “sunrise” and “sunset” processes to review 
occupational licensing requirements.  In 2013, Texas adopted a sunrise type of law for 
occupational licensing proposals to be reviewed and analyzed before consideration by the 
legislature, but the process is apparently not mandatory, as it apparently was not used in 
any of the many licensing proposals filed in 2015.  Since the literature and case studies 
suggest that parties who stand to benefit tend to dominate the licensing process and that 
groups representing the public are usually not involved, a true analysis of the pros and 
cons of enacting occupational licensing legislation, along with a list of alternative policy 
options for each proposal would be positive.  Maine has a very thorough sunrise process 
for occupational licensing proposals, and Texas legislators should at least look into the 
merits of discussing such a process.  Texas does have a sunset process where each agency 
is subject to review by the Texas Sunset Commission on a periodic basis.  Legislation 
must pass to keep agencies operating past the sunset date.  Therefore, occupational 
licensing laws are subject to sunset review due to the fact that if an agency was abolished, 
licensing overseen by the agency would also be abolished.  In making changes before 
reauthorizing an agency, legislators could also consider changes to occupational licensing 
policies overseen by the agency.  However, it seems as the sunset review process is often 
driven by much more noticeable policy matters than that of occupational licensing, and 
that licensing usually continues unchanged after a sunset review, with very little 
discussion.  Better discussion would bring about a chance to determine positives and 




negatives associated with licensing that has been on the books and the results that have 
been realized from such practices.  Even when the Sunset Commission recommends 
deregulation of an occupation, it seems to rarely happen in Texas.  For instance, in 2013, 
the commission recommended the deregulation of interior designers, noting that there 
were few complaints about interior designers, very little regulatory activity, and virtually 
no threats to public health and safety.  Licensed interior designers spent weeks lobbying 
legislators, speaking at hearings, and doing other things to convince policymakers that 
their licensing should remain intact.  As a result, the deregulation proposal was left out of 
the sunset bill and an attempt on the House floor by State Representative Matt Schaefer 
to amend the bill to follow the commission’s recommendation to deregulate the 
occupation was defeated.  In 2015, a review of the Department of State Health Services 
promoted the Sunset Commission to call for the deregulation of 15 different occupations.  
Ultimately, in reauthorizing the agency, the legislature chose to deregulate only six of the 
recommended occupations.  Despite the results, in these instances, there was at least 
some discussion of occupational licensing.  Far more often, licensing requirements in the 
agencies are not even discussed during the sunset review process.  A potential policy 
reform would make each occupational licensing requirement subject to its own sunset 
review.  In this case, when an agency was up for review, any occupational licensing 
program administered by the agency would also be up for its own review.  Legislators 
would be required to pass legislation to continue the licensing programs and could choose 
to leave them unchanged, make changes as necessary, or deregulate the occupations.  
While the addition of reviewing specific licensing policies would take more time than the 




current sunset review process, it would also serve an important public policy function of 
bringing more attention to occupational licensing from legislators and the public alike.
8. The Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives should consider the 
benefits of diversity of thought when appointing members of the House Committee on 
Licensing and Administrative Procedures.  While this committee does not hear all 
occupational licensing legislation, they do get the bulk of it.  In reviewing footage of 
committee hearings from the case studies, it became obvious that there was very little 
diversity of thought with committee members.  Committee members asked no specific 
questions about the costs and benefits of licensing to the bill authors or people testifying 
in support of the legislation, nor did they ask about the true risks to public health and 
safety associated with occupations or whether there were other, less restrictive policy 
options that might work to address concerns.  Most occupational licensing proposals that 
make it out of committee seem to do so with virtually no opposing votes, another sign of 
the lack of diversity of thought on the committee.  Just as noticeable is that based on all 
legislation related to occupational licensing that has been filed over the last four 
legislative sessions, bills calling to create a new license or expand the applicability of 
existing licenses are much more likely to at least get a hearing than are bills to loosen 
regulations or deregulate occupations.  This is another sign that committee members 
seem to have a certain bias in this policy area.
9. Legislators who present proposals to create occupational licenses should 
be prepared to articulate why the licensing is necessary in terms of public health and 
safety concerns in committee hearings and on the House and Senate floors.  This was 
largely absent in the case studies, aside from some general, hypothetical concerns.  




Statistical tests verified that safety concerns are not significant in determining whether or 
not a Texas occupation will have licensing requirements.  Perhaps they do not articulate 
these reasons because they do not expect other legislators to question them.  Other 
legislators, regardless of whether they generally support or oppose this type of legislation, 
should be more willing to ask their colleagues specific questions about costs, benefits, 
and health and safety concerns.  If these issues were discussed openly, legislators could 
cast a better informed vote on licensing proposals.
10. Legislators should attempt to hear input from a variety of sources, not just 
those with more political power and organization.  Regardless of the issue at hand, 
legislators are faced with the challenge of representing constituents and their 
responsibility to the state as a whole, regardless of whether constituents are vocal through 
lobby groups and campaigns.  This could be done very simply.  For example, if groups of 
interior designers associated with certain professional associations were lobbying in favor 
of stricter licensing requirements, a legislator could easily contact interior designers in his 
or her district that were not affiliated with the same organization to get input.  While the 
input may or may not be the same as the legislator has already heard, it would show an 
effort to consider multiple points of view.  It is quite possible that most legislators already 
do this, but the case studies did not show them making use of such information in 
committee hearings or floor debates on licensing proposals.
11. Lawmakers would be well served by reviewing the structure of regulatory 
boards that oversee different agencies and occupational licensing programs.  The 
literature often refers to regulatory capture, where members of a profession take over 
regulatory functions to make them favorable to themselves and other current 




practitioners.  In the case of North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
Commission, decided in early 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a 
regulatory structure giving practitioners in the dental industry the majority voice in the 
regulation of non-dentistry teeth whitening businesses was a violation of anti-trust laws
(North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission 574
U.S.) To avoid such problems, legislators should consider making public members the 
majority of such regulatory boards, while members of the affected occupation would be 
in the minority.  This would allow experience and knowledge from the occupation to be 
introduced into the process, but would allow the public members who would be likely to 
be less biased to have the greatest say in carrying out regulatory functions.  Also, since 
the stated objective of most licensing legislation is to protect the public, it makes sense 
that the general public would be well represented in carrying out regulatory functions.  
The literature also suggests that licensing boards dominated by practitioners tend to not 
want to levy punishments on one of their own and, instead, that they focus enforcement 
efforts on unlicensed practice.  Boards dominated by public members might be more 
likely to issue sanctions in the case of true health or safety violations by licensed 
practitioners.
12. The Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives and the Lieutenant 
Governor, who presides over the Senate, should consider appointing an interim joint 
committee of House and Senate members to study already existing occupational licensing 
policies between legislative sessions, giving them plenty of time to study the issues and, 
if necessary, prepare proposals to address concerns for future legislative sessions.  A 
similar action was taken by the House of Representatives back in 2008 and an 




informative report was produced, but very little action was taken in regards to issues 
raised in the report.  In appointing such a committee, it would be helpful to have a diverse 
group of senators and representatives representing diverse constituencies, including 
members that have not previously served on committees considering occupational 
licensing issues.
13. Legislators should consider the merits of legislation introduced in 2015 
such as House Bill 3170, authored by Representative Matt Schaefer, and Senate Bill 
1346, authored by Senator Don Huffines.  These bills, similar in nature, would have 
shifted the burden of proof to the state in enforcement actions for occupational licensing 
violations.  For instance, if an individual was accused by a licensing authority of a rule 
violation and the individual challenged the rule in terms of whether it was relevant for 
public health and safety, the state would be legally required to prove why it was relevant.  
Currently, the state has no burden of proof and a court will consider things to be health 
and safety concerns simply because such is stated in statutes or administrative rules.  A 
change in the manner proposed by Schaefer and Huffines seems to be fair in terms of due 
process for individuals, while still protecting the ability of the state to enforce matters 
related to health and safety concerns.  Neither bill even received a public hearing in the 
2015 legislative session.
14. Legislators should consider how occupational licensing policies affect 
worker mobility.  States vary greatly in the specific requirements to gain licensure in 
specific occupations.  A successful cosmetologist in Massachusetts could move to Texas 
and learn that he or she not only has to obtain a new occupational license, but might not 
even meet the requirements for doing so without attaining more educational hours, 




something that an individual who has already successfully worked in an occupation might 
find to be very costly and time consuming.  Also, the literature suggests that military 
spouses are disproportionately affected, as a large percentage of this group holds 
occupational licenses and they may be more likely to move than other individuals.  Some 
current Texas statutes and administrative rules allow for reciprocity with certain states for 
certain occupations, but usually only if the requirements under which an individual 
obtained a license elsewhere are “substantially similar” to those in Texas, and it is usually 
up to individual licensing authorities to evaluate each applicant and make a decision as to 
whether substantially similar requirements have been met.  With no specific guidelines, 
results of this policy vary tremendously in who is granted reciprocity and who is not.  
One option would be the passage of legislation such as House Bill 2484, introduced by
Representative Matt Schaefer during the 2015 session.  This bill would have provided 
blanket reciprocity for any out of state applicant for an occupational license if they had 
held a license to perform the same job duties in their prior state.  Of course, reciprocity 
requirements such as those called for in Schaefer’s bill would not help an unlicensed 
plumber who legally worked in Kansas, for example, but moved to Texas.  In such cases 
of individuals with job experience working in states that do not require licenses for their 
occupation, legislators could consider implementing a system of verifying training and 
employment experience in the previous state of residence and setting a minimal standard 
for the granting of a Texas occupational license.  Part of determining the effects of 
licensing on worker mobility would also include the legislature studying the requirements 
for occupational licenses enacted at the municipal level.  The literature suggests that most 
licenses are not enacted at the municipal level but in a large state like Texas, that could 




lead to concerns.  If an individual moved from Houston, working under a state license, to 
El Paso only to find that they needed to obtain an additional municipal license with more 
stringent requirements than the state license, there could be problems as the cities are 
hundreds of miles apart and the individual would not be able to work until meeting the 
new licensing requirements.  In small states where workers could easily commute to 
anywhere in the state, this might not be such a concern, but it is important in Texas.  
Licensing requirements at the municipal level and the effects thereof would be an 
important topic for an additional study.  Before that takes place, the legislature could 
consider a measure like House Bill 3263, filed by State Representative Ryan Guillen in 
2015.  This bill would have prohibited municipalities from requiring their own licenses 
for any occupations that were already licensed by the state, as a way to ensure that 
workers were held to the same standards across the state.  The bill stated that any 
municipal ordinance or rule that was already effective was void and unenforceable.  The 
bill was given a public hearing in the House Committee on Urban Affairs, but was never 
brought up for a vote by the committee chair.  While a measure like Guillen’s proposal 
would help with worker mobility concerns, a thorough study of occupational licensing at 
the municipal level might reveal important information about the type and number of 
occupations licensed at that level which are not already licensed by the state and about 
the costs and benefits of those licensing requirements, as well.  As a public policy 
principle, it is not desirable for workers who move to a new state or to a new part of the 
state to be unable to work, if it can be avoided.  If people cannot find a job for which they 
have been trained, it is likely that unemployment rates will be higher.  If this happens, 
higher demands could result for unemployment benefits and other social programs.




15. If there is no evidence that new or expanded occupational licensing 
requirements are necessary to protect public health and safety and the legislature passes 
them anyway, the governor should consider vetoing the legislation.  During his 2014 
campaign and in a speech prior to his January 2015 inauguration, Texas Governor Greg 
Abbott called for occupational licensing reform including the repeal of unnecessary 
licensing requirements, and scaling back others to only address legitimate health and 
safety concerns among other things.  After his inauguration, no records indicate that 
Abbott has publicly addressed the issue again.  Although there were fewer new or 
expanded licensing requirements passed by the legislature in 2015 as opposed to other 
recent legislative sessions, Abbott signed them all into law despite being asked by 
legislators to veto at least one of them.  Without direct legislative power, this would be 
the governor’s only opportunity to directly affect the process and it should be used if the 
circumstances warrant doing so.  
Part Five: Putting Together Findings
This work began as an attempt to answer some questions on a policy topic that 
affects many citizens and public policy decision makers across the United States-
occupational licensing.  As there is a void of information that studies occupational 
licensing in an academic manner, this work began as an attempt to “scratch the surface” 
of the topic and attempt to answer some basic questions about the topic.  In some ways, 
the study raised additional questions beyond those that were considered, but some 
important findings also became clear.  This dissertation utilized case studies, based on an 
extensive examination of public records related to six specific occupational licensing 
proposals in Texas.  When combining the results of the case studies with the results of 




related empirical work, several trends emerged.  For instance, the literature suggested that 
policymakers and interest groups may often jump on a licensing “bandwagon” and begin 
supporting licensing requirements with the main justification being the fact that many 
other states also have licensing requirements for the same occupation or other similar 
occupations.  In almost all of the case studies, someone supporting the licensing proposal 
whether it was the legislative sponsor or someone in the occupation supporting the 
measure quoted statistics about the number of other states requiring licensing in the 
occupation.  Without asking for specifics on the costs and benefits of specific licensing 
requirements found in those states and without asking what triggered the licensing in the 
states that first passed it, legislators seemed to take that as a valid reason for promoting 
licensing legislation. The promotion of proposals by using the amount of states with 
similar licensing requirements is something that was backed up by empirical study.  Out 
of variables studied, the only significant predictor of whether or not Texas would require 
licensing in specific occupations was the amount of other states requiring licensing in the 
occupation.  
In another part of this work, licensing proposals across the United States were 
studied via the specific occupation of behavior analysts.  Once again, information gleaned 
in the literature was backed up by both case studies and empirical work.  It was suggested 
that sometimes, the public policy decision as to whether or not to require licensing in a 
specific occupation was the product of competition between organized political interests.  
In three of the six case studies from Texas, there were significant, well organized 
interests represented on each side of the issue, and the groups that were opposing 
licensure were heavily involved in the political process, just like the supporters.  In these 




three case studies, the licensing proposals failed while three other case studies saw 
organized interests supporting licensing but no significant opposition.  In each of these 
cases, the licensing proposal passed.  Out of independent variables studied for the 
occupation of behavior analysts across the United States, empricial work shows the most 
significant predictor to be the number of members belonging to groups opposing 
licensure.  Again, this ties the literature to the case studies and the empirical work.
Another theme that echoed between the literature, the case studies, and the 
empirical work is the lack of determination as to whether health and safety risks to the 
public play a large role in occupational licensing considerations. One of the first things 
that is usually stated as to why there is a need for occupational licensing is due to the risk 
posed to the public by incompetent practitioners and bad actors who might work in a 
given occupation.  However, the literature called into question as to whether or not this 
was actually the case.  In the case studies, the risk posed by bad actors was sometimes 
mentioned, but there were no specific examples utilized in any debates of harm being 
perpretrated on the public.  Not only were specific examples not detailed by supporters of 
such legislation, but other decision makers did not press them for specifics and seemed to 
make their decisions without this knowledge.  In the part of the empirical work dealing 
with whether or not a Texas occupation is likely to be licensed, the risk posed to the 
public as determined by reported accident rates was not found to be a significant factor in 
whether licensing would be required.  While that alone doesn’t show that risk is not a 
factor, combined with the case studies and the literature, it certainly calls into question 
how much attention that true health and safety concerns actually get in the process and 




whether or not decision makers separate true concerns from hypothetical scenarios 
mentioned in policy debates.
The policy recommendations are meant to not only address the major findings of 
the study, but also to address other issues that became noticeable through the literature 
and the case studies.  For example, this study did not focus on aspects of criminalizing 
work or the effect of occupational licensing on workers with criminal records, however, 
the policy recommendations section contains comments on those issues because 
legislators who approach this subject in a public policy context would be well served to 
study occupational licensing on a very broad basis, and not just on a few specific issues.
Overall, this study should be a significant contribution to the topic of occupational 
licensing, as it takes a major Texas public policy issue that has never been addressed in 
an academic context and does just that.  Many other studies could be performed over time 
with the same topic.  For instance, specific licensing requirements could be studied over 
time to determine when they were first enacted, what types of concerns were raised at 
that time, and whether or not any proposals to change those have been made over time.  
Comparisons could be made to the same process playing out in other states.  Also, more 
occupations could be studied across the United States to build on the work with behavior 
analysts.  This would help determine if the significant predictors of licensing for behavior 
analysts across the United States were also significant in other occupations as well.  
Other beneficial studies could attempt to answer questions about the effect of 
occupational licensing on unemployment rates, employment of those with criminal 
records, and the number of service providers available for the public.  Finally, a similar 
study could be performed after the Texas Legislature takes action that is expected in 




coming months.  In November 2015 Joe Straus, Speaker of the Texas House of 
Representatives, announced interim charges for House committees.  These are issues that 
committees are told to study between the biennial legislative sessions for the purpose of 
developing policy recommendations that can be discussed during the next legislative 
session.  Out of five interim charges for the House Committee on Licensing and 
Administrative Procedures, first on the list is to “identify all occupations licensed by the 
state to determine if they are necessary for public safety and health. Determine if any 
criminal penalties associated with licensure are unnecessarily punitive, recommend 
methods to improve reciprocity with other states, and determine if a mandatory 
certification program could be used in lieu of mandatory licensure” (Texas House of 
Representatives 2015, 45). Following this process could be the start of a new case study, 
as the speaker’s specific charge for this issue may cause legislators to pay more attention 
to health and safety requirements, along with other issues that do not often seem to be 
considered.  If the committee takes significant action with this charge, new policy 
proposals would begin in January 2017, making the issue important for further study.
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